The Kosovo
War:
No Failure, All Had an Interest In It
TFF PressInfo 42
"Look at what happens in Kosovo and you would like to
believe that all good powers worked for PREVENTION of this
tragedy but that, unfortunately, tragedies happen.
Governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental
organisations are already overloaded with ongoing conflicts
and catastrophes; budgets are tight etc. Admittedly these
are very complex problems; and just as all diseases cannot
be prevented, we can't expect all wars to be prevented.
According to this theory, if things go wrong it is the
parties' fault and if they go well it is thanks to the
international community and a few shuttling envoys or
diplomats. World media naively corroborate this theory: We
watch how diplomats, envoys, and delegations fly around,
hold press conferences, meet their kin in palaces or make
solemn declarations if they don't issue threats. In short,
do all they can to stop wars and force people to negotiation
tables, don't they?
Well, no outbreak of violence on earth was more
predictable than the one in Kosovo. There have been more
early warnings about this conflict than about any other, but
there was no early listening and no early action. There was
neither the required conflict-management competence nor
political will to prevent it.
We live in an increasingly interdependent world; we are
told that hardly anything belongs to the internal affairs of
states. The other side of that coin is that Kosovo was and
is our problem. If we believe in this theory we must ask:
when will honest people, including politicians, begin to
openly and self-critically discuss why they fail again and
again to avert even the most predictable wars? Is it human
folly, institutional immaturity, are diplomats just not
appropriately trained in violence prevention and
conflict-resolution, or what?
I am afraid there is another more accurate but less
pleasant explanation," says TFF director Jan Oberg after his
recent mission to Belgrade, Prishtina and Skopje where he
had more than 50 conversations with heads of states, party
leaders, intellectuals, media people and NGOs.
"This other explanation is less apologetic, more cynical.
It simply assumes that things like Kosovo happen because it
is in the INTEREST of powerful actors that it happens.
Preventive measures are merely a cover-up for such less
noble interests. I can't avoid the feeling that in the case
of Kosovo many central actors had an interest in this
war.
The Yugoslav government has insisted for years that
Kosovo-Albanians are not only separatists but also
terrorists, that Dr. Rugova's leadership based on pragmatic
non-violence was just a facade. It reminds us of periods in
the 1970s, 1980s and now 1990s to prove its point. And now
there is an Albanian Army and its spokesman repeatedly talks
about total independence and unification towards a Greater
Albania. "There you see," Yugoslav president Milosevic can
argue, "we were right and you people in the international
community were fooled by the Albanians. We now just preserve
the integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia like you would
if you had a similar movement in your territory."
The Yugoslav/Serbian opposition which - like the
government - has absolutely no idea about what to do with
Kosovo, can blame Milosevic: "There you see, Milosevic took
no initiatives to start negotiations, he just won time. Now
he has proved that he could not solve it as an internal
affair, so now we have more foreign diplomats running around
here than ever! He will be even more powerful by winning the
war in Kosovo and no one dare start reforms or demonstrate
in the streets of Belgrade while this happens. Our economy
will be even worse but that's what everybody expects anyhow;
the people are in apathy from all these years of economic
deprivation and isolation from the international community.
In the shadow of Kosovo, the regime now also tramples on the
freedom and independence of the judiciary, the universities
and media. Milosevic knows the international community won't
tolerate secession through violence, and he needs crisis to
keep himself in power. And the international community needs
him for Dayton and to keep separatism elsewhere at bay."
President Rugova of the self-proclaimed independent state
of Kosova who favours nonviolence, might tell you this:
"There you see, since 1989 we have warned the international
community that we could not keep the population behind the
nonviolent line if we did not get some help to achieve some
results, either by NATO presence or bombings or by forcing
Belgrade to negotiate with us. But no one really did
anything to help us to achieve our human rights nor to get
out of this police state."
The Albanian opposition may see it this way: "There you
see, Rugova never listened to us. He didn't allow the
assembly of our elected parliament, he increasingly
marginalised all other leaders and controlled the press.
Presumably he has always been in collusion with Milosevic.
He is not a dictator but his strategy yielded nothing; he
promised an independent Kosova but where is it? We in the
opposition knew that it had to end in violence, the only
thing Belgrade understands."
The leaders of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA/UCK), we
may imagine, will reason somewhat along the same lines but
add: "Many of us were political prisoners and when we came
out nobody listened to us. We are now risking our lives for
the liberation of our Kosovan Motherland and we simply don't
listen to politicians anymore, least of all Rugova. Power
grows out of our guns so you better see UCK as the real
present and future political power here in Kosova."
Well, but did the international community not do a lot to
prevent war in Kosovo? I don't think so," continues Jan
Oberg.
"The Kosovo issue was never high on the agendas in Hague,
in London or in Geneva; it was not included in Dayton and no
other initiatives were taken. Yugoslavia was recognised as a
sovereign state with the Kosovo province inside but with no
modalities. No systematic negotiation effort was ever tried
and is not being tried even now. The best time to have found
a tolerable solution was in 1992-93 when Milan Panic was
prime minister; he had honest, energetic ministers for
justice, human rights and education who did more than any
other government before or after to solve this problem - but
they got no support from the West. The Kosovars said 'no
thanks' to dialogue with Panic because their strategy of
mobilisation of international support and intervention stood
a better chance with a "bad guy" like Milosevic in Belgrade
than with a "nice guy" there like Panic.
Didn't the international community know that war was
brewing in Kosovo? Of course it did! Look - in and
around Kosovo, in Albania, Belgrade and Macedonia the
international community has, for years, had NATO, US troops,
the UN and OSCE missions in Macedonia, a US government
office in the centre of Prishtina, EU monitors, embassies,
shuttle diplomats, it has had intelligence officers from
numerous countries and satellites in space which can monitor
movements and see number plates on cars. Are we really to
believe that the build-up of the Kosova Liberation Army, the
training of soldiers and civilians, the acquisition of
hundreds of thousands of arms and tons of ammunition that
has gone on - according to Albanian sources - since 1992-93
was unknown and that the outbreak of war in the region came
as a surprise? None of the diplomats I met who have served
in the region for quite some time denied that all this was
well-known. But their governments back home turned the blind
eye to the lead-up to the war and prevented none of it.
The international community has decided that its
interventions and missions in Macedonia and Albania are
successful, albeit not perfect. Period! That the one-time
friend of the West, Sali Berisha, now runs the
uncontrollable Northern Albania which is the de facto base
for KLA/UCK proves it may not have been such a success.
Macedonia is stable and democratic, we've been told for
years, irrespective of the fact that all the old problems
remain basically unresolved. UNPREDEP is a marvellous
mission but it was stationed in Macedonia for the wrong
reasons - to prevent a completely unlikely aggression by
Serbia into Macedonia.
The international community did not get a mission into
Kosovo where it would have been relevant. Instead, in 1991
it foolishly suspended Rest-Yugslavia's perfectly legitimate
membership of the OSCE after which Rest-Yugoslavia
discontinued OSCE's three missions in Kosovo, Voivodina and
Sandzak. Had they been around until today, the war would
hardly have happened. So, whatever the international
community would have done recently to "prevent" the Kosovo
war, it would implicitly have recognised that earlier
actions were not such big successes. Or outright
failures.
At least some powerful actors saw it to be in their
interest NOT to prevent the present war in Kosovo.
I see quite a few such interests," says TFF's director
who has worked with the Kosovo conflict on both sides since
1992.
First, you make contradictory commitments that satisfy
conflicting governments in the EU/ Contact group and the US.
Thus, for years you support the idea of sovereignty and
integrity and remind everyone that borders cannot be changed
by force. But while you do that you also want to punish
Serbia for its behaviour in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, so
you receive Dr. Rugova in all possible capitals and
parliaments and listen to his maximalist policy of
independence for Kosova and support his minimalist strategy
of nonviolence. Since 1991 you do three things that
encourage all Albanians: a) you never dissociate your
government from the Kosovo-Albanian press claims that they
have the international community's support for an
independent state (while what you told them was that you
supported their struggle for human rights); b) you never
invite a Yugoslav diplomat or minister to your office to
listen to that side of the story, and c) you let American
presidents make various hints that the West will come to
rescue Kosova should Serbia misbehave."
Second, wars like this are in the interest of those who
profiteer from the trade in arms, drugs, prostitutes, looted
war property, cigarettes, oil etc., the smugglers, the
mafia, the security services, mercenary companies, private
consultancy firms and paramilitary formations - which do the
dirty job for democratic governments. They are promoted and
protected by politicians who have come to power through a)
Western-endorsed free and fair, democratic elections, b)
privatisation of the social(ist) property created up till
1989 by employees everywhere, and c) simple
war-profiteering. Thus the Eastern European as well as the
Caucasian environment now breeds one
politico-economic-military-bureaucratic-criminal - PEMBC -
complex after the other. They have the real power while many
with formal titles are either powerless or incompetent as
politicians.
Third, you deliberately wait to intervene until violence
and chaos reign. Then you can present Mr. Holbrooke,
Christopher Hill - or some other presumed miracle-maker -
the EU, the Contact Group or NATO as saviours and
peacemakers and argue: "There you see, you proved you could
not manage your own problems, we have to manage them for
you." When that role is established, you can much more
easily dictate the terms of a negotiation as well as an
outcome that fits your longterm strategic, political and
economic interests in the region. All, of course, is done in
the name of peace, democratisation, privatisation,
marketisation and human rights. So, the more the
international community "fails" to prevent violence in
non-vital countries, the more it can control and gain in
them later.
Four, you use the opportunity to present NATO as the
eminent new 'peacekeeper' - and keep the UN in the shadow.
There are threats of NATO bombings or intervention, there
are exercises and statements about who could be taught a
lesson, if...So, it looks like "we do something, we won't
accept a new Bosnia" - and similar nonsense. This serves to
hide earlier conflict-management fiascoes from citizens in
Europe and the US. These threats, in clear support for the
Albanians and UCK/KLA come three years after the same
countries helped Croatia to ethnically cleanse its territory
of 250 000 perfectly legitimate Serb citizens of that
republic. Not very credible or moral, but who remembers?
True, it costs a little more with all these troops,
missions, military aid, exercises, training programs,
humanitarian aid and economic aid for reconstruction, but it
establishes the international community - the US in
particular - as masters for long enough to bring these
"failed states" under the control that is essential to
transforming them into submissive allies in the larger
process of globalisation and world order transformation. And
they are expected to be grateful to the West.
Concretely in Kosovo: this way of handling the conflict
serves to strengthen Milosevic in the short run and weaken
him in the long run. Iraq seems increasingly to be the State
Department's model in Serbia, and the EU has no ideas and no
common policy for the region. Some kind of partition of
Kosovo will create even more internal conflicts among
Albanians in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia - thus easier to
control by the West in decades to come. Germany will advance
diplomatically, economically and little by little also
militarily; the whole region is already a DM zone and
Germany has replaced Serbia as Macedonia's largest trading
partner. The US will provide the overall framework a la
Dayton and then the strategic, NATO-oriented impetus, the
training of police, security and military of these "failed"
but resurrected states as it has done from Croatia down
through half of Bosnia to Albania and Macedonia. No wonder
that US diplomats head almost all international missions in
the region now.
In short, Kosovo or rather Serbia/Yugoslavia is now the
centre of the globalisation and world order restructuring.
The modes of operation differ but it is part of the same
transformation that we have seen in Mexico, South Korea,
Indonesia, Somalia, the Great Lakes, Croatia, Bosnia and
Iraq. It implies a power struggle between the US/NATO and a
Balkanized, loud-shouting but paralysed EU.
Who pays the price? Innocent
citizens-turned-refugees and 90% of the other ordinary
citizens in these lands, many of whom lack the education or
political consciousness to see through the games played over
and above their heads. Next, civil society, co-existence and
human community. And, third, moral values and the ideas of
democracy, trust and - peace.
You may find my view cynical but I am convinced that only
by being cynical in the analysis can we be truly humane and
work to help those who suffer from all these double
standards and power games," concludes Jan Oberg.
August 17, 1998
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