What
must be Belgrade's
minimum conditions and its
media strategy
Kosovo
Solution Series # 6
PressInfo #
214
March
30, 2005
By
Aleksandar
Mitic,
TFF Associate & Jan
Oberg,
TFF director
Relevant background links
for this series here.
Belgrade has stated clearly that
"full independence", including the "hidden independence"
in the form of "conditional independence" is out of
question. The "conditional independence" does not change
the negative outcome from the point of view of Belgrade:
Kosovo is to be independent once it fulfils certain
criteria. Belgrade and the Serb community consider
"conditional independence" rhetoric -- very popular among
near-governmental organizations, policymakers and
pro-Albanian lobbyists -a "bluff".
Belgrade has, on the other hand,
accepted the recent approach by the European Union which
argues that there can be no return to the pre-1999
situation. A new solution, between autonomy as it was and
complete independence must therefore be found.
Atypical solutions are indeed not a
novelty in the post-war former Yugoslavia. Such solutions
have been found by the international community and the
different sides with the creation of two semi-independent
entities in Bosnia - the Republika Srpska and the
Muslim-Croat federation - in Dayton (1995), the Ohrid
accord (2001) between Macedonians and Albanians in
Macedonia, as well as the Belgrade agreement (2003)
between Belgrade and Podgorica on the state of Serbia and
Montenegro.
No serious Serbian politician nor
policymaker is as gullible as to believe that Kosovo can
be managed from Belgrade, that Serb police and soldiers
are to be re-deployed from central Serbia to secure
Kosovo, or that Kosovo should not have its own budget,
police force and representation abroad. They know it very
well.
But no serious Serbian politician
nor policymaker is ready to accept "full" or
"conditional" independence - two sides of the same
coin.
In seeking a final solution, it
would be wise of the international community to give
special attention to issues such as:
1) Demilitarization of the
area, with some international presence and a strong
OSCE-trained local police.
2) Guarantees against later
secession or joining of neighbouring countries, in
particular Albania and the regions of western
Macedonia.
3) There can be no "border" nor
"border crossings" between Serbia and
Kosovo.
4) A "positive discrimination"
of all minorities in Kosovo, in parliament and in
public institutions.
5) Serb cultural heritage, such
as the monasteries, must receive special
extra-territorial status and the property of the
Serbian Orthodox Church must be fully protected and
restored.
6) There has to be huge
compensation for lost property to Serb citizens and to
Belgrade for state property.
7) There must be an
international judiciary system set up in
Kosovo.
8) Serbia-Montenegro's road to
EU integrations must be smoothed and the first results
must be visible before the talks on the final status
begin.
9) Return of all those displaced
Serbs and other minorities who so wish must be
assured. Freedom of movement must be guaranteed,
security and human rights for the Serbs and other
minorities must become one of the main priorities for
the special region of Kosovo
10) Economic viability of Kosovo
has to be fully analyzed and trade barriers must be
brought down.
11) There must remain an
international presence until it can be safely assumed
that all the above provisions pertaining to human
rights and other minority issues will be working well
without such an international presence. It has to be
welcomed - but isn't sufficient - that there is a low
tension and a "knowing how to behave well" with
17.000 NATO troops and thousands of other
internationals in Kosovo; it must also work well
after they have left.
For all involved - and for the EU -
the economic development dimensions of independence must
be given a new status in the future discussions. No
independent European state can live on a combination of
non-productive investments, 70% unemployment and a
largely black economy combined with organised crime and
be said to satisfy European standards.
We know from the break-up of old
Yugoslavia that the ethnic dimension of the conflicts was
driven mainly by structural economic crisis. A new Kosovo
with a non-viable economy is likely to be consumed in
inter-ethnic violence or Albanian-Albanian violence
whereas independence with a reasonable, legal-based
economic development may serve to prevent future ethnic
violence. In other words, learn one of the most important
lessons from former Yugoslavia when you deal with
Kosovo's future!
A
media strategy for Serbia
Since Belgrade is a partner without
which a just and long-lasting agreement on Kosovo is
impossible, Serbian authorities must come up with a
comprehensive pro-active policy and communication
strategy. The old mantras of "we are right and need not
prove it", "we are good and need not prove it", "truth is
on our side and we need not prove it" must be abandoned
immediately.
In order to play a dynamic
pro-active rôle, Belgrade must:
1) Form a creative media
team, made up of consultants, media and PR experts
ready to present and argue the arguments mentioned
above with the main message being: "an independent
Kosovo is impossible and unacceptable but there are
several other just solutions still possible".
2) Express as soon as possible
the common vision of all state and political
structures about the future of Kosovo, a flexible and
compromising solution -- "between standard autonomy
and full independence" - which will offer a true
European perspective for all actors in the region
instead of an option which contains in itself the seed
of destruction and irredentism.
3) Lead a diplomatic offensive
through the diplomatic network at the bilateral and
multilateral level.
4) Devise a pro-active media
strategy, involving teams set up in key Western
capitals (Brussels, Paris, London, Berlin, Washington,
New York, Rome, Madrid, etc) which would be in charge
of:
- Media relations and
contacts with key actors in the industry.
- Policy promotion and
briefings of the media, analysts and think-tanks.
- Fast reaction to
inaccuracies, unreasonable and extremist
views.
- Fast and reliable answer to
all inquiries about the issue.
- Alarming states,
think-tanks, NGOs and the media about the dangers
of the independence of Kosovo.
- Networking with all those
seeking to find a viable solution in
Kosovo.
- Getting the views of the
alternative media in the mainstream.
- Devising a strong and
up-to-date internet-based awareness campaign.
- Distributing promotional
material.
- Pointing out to alternative
news sources.
- Fighting for the "media
context" of the Kosovo issue.
- Setting up a "bank of
ideas" on the Kosovo issue, primarily focused on
human interest stories.
- Setting up well-organised
archives (audio, TV, internet, text, graphics,
statistics).
The TFF Kosovo
Solution Series
# 1
Why
the solution in Kosovo matters to the
world
# 2
The
media - strategic considerations
# 3
The
main preconditions for a sustainable solution to the
Kosovo conflict
# 4
The
situation as seen from Serbia
# 5
The
arguments for quick and total independence are not
credible
# 6
What
must be Belgrade's minimum conditions and its media
strategy
# 7
Nations
and states, sovereignty and
self-determination
# 8
Positive
scenarios: Turn to the future, look at the broader
perspectives
# 9
Many
thinkable models for future Kosovo
# 10
Summary:
From "Only one solution" towards democracy and
peace
NOTE
Relevant
background links for this series.
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