The
non-proliferation bargain:
nuclear disarmament is the key to success
PressInfo #
196
April 19,
2004
by
David
Krieger,
TFF Associate
In Danish
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In Swedish
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The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
entered into force in 1970, is the centerpiece of
international efforts to control the spread of nuclear
weapons. Perhaps the treaty was given the wrong name when
it was created because the treaty is about nuclear
disarmament as well as non-proliferation. At the heart of
the treaty is a deal between those states that possess
nuclear weapons and those that do not. The deal, simply
put, is that the nuclear weapons states agree to the
complete disarmament of their nuclear arsenals, while the
non-nuclear weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear
weapons. This agreement, or bargain, between the parties
to the treaty, setting forth the course of action each
will pursue with regard to nuclear weapons, is the most
important aspect of the treaty. It is, however, the least
understood, particularly by American citizens.
The sad fact is that from the
inception of the treaty the nuclear weapon states have
shown scant inclination to fulfill their part of the
bargain. As recently as the year 2000, the nuclear weapon
states agreed to 13 practical steps to achieve nuclear
disarmament. Their record is an almost perfect failure,
not because they tried and failed but because they lacked
the political will to even seriously try. Without a
serious effort by the nuclear weapon states to achieve
nuclear disarmament, the treaty appears to enshrine
double standards that give special privileges to the
nuclear weapon states. In fact, it is not the treaty that
promotes double standards, but the nuclear weapon states
themselves.
A year ago the United States
initiated a preventive war against Iraq based on the
claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or
programs to create them, including nuclear weapons
programs. Setting aside the now doubtful veracity of the
claims, the US-led war underlines the double standards in
the non-proliferation regime. By contrast, the US
remained silent about the proliferation activities of its
ally in the "war on terror," Pakistan. When it was
revealed that Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan was selling
nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya, and was
pardoned by the Pakistani government after he admitted
these serious transgressions, the US had little to say.
Similarly, the US has never publicly raised the issue of
the known proliferation of nuclear weapons to Israel. All
of this points to double standards that are inconsistent
with the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with
effective attempts to control the spread of nuclear
weapons.
In a February 2004 speech at the
National Defense University, George Bush addressed the
threat of nuclear proliferation. "The greatest threat
before humanity today," he said, "is the possibility of
secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or
radiological or nuclear weapons." Among the seven
proposals put forward by Mr. Bush was one calling for the
40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to "refuse to
sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and
technologies to any state that does not already possess
full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing
plants." That this proposal met with a round of applause
suggests how little his audience, and Americans in
general, are attuned to issues of double
standards.
We commend Mr. Bush for calling on
all countries "to strengthen the laws and international
controls that govern proliferation," including
criminalizing proliferation. Mr. Bush is right in seeking
to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. He is wrong in
thinking that it can be done based on an international
system of double standards that favor some nations over
others. Nuclear weapons anywhere are a threat to people
everywhere. As Mohamed Elbaradei, the Director of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, warned in a speech on
the day following Mr. Bush's speech, "If the world does
not change course, we risk self-destruction."
Elbaradei called for tightening and
universalizing controls over the export of nuclear
materials, empowering the international inspectors,
preventing withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
bringing sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle under
international control, initiating long overdue
negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and
having the nuclear weapon states move forward on nuclear
disarmament. Elbaradei called nuclear disarmament a
"fundamental part of the nonproliferation
bargain."
"We must abandon the unworkable
notion," Elbaradei said, "that it is morally
reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of
mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to
rely on them for security, and indeed to continue to
refine their capacities and postulate plans for their
use." Certainly he must have had in mind programs, such
as "mini-nukes" and "bunker-busting" nuclear weapons
being pursued by the US administration, when he made this
statement.
Moving
Forward
ElBaradei's
proposals are useful and necessary, as are those of Mr.
Bush that do not enshrine double standards, but they are
not sufficient to stop nuclear proliferation. A more
comprehensive and urgent program is needed to achieve
this critical goal because the consequences of failure
are so drastic. The type of serious program that must be
implemented if we are to prevent further nuclear
proliferation with all its attendant threats is set forth
below.
1. Universal
application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The treaty cannot
be effective unless it is applicable to all states in the
world without exception. Currently, India, Pakistan and
Israel are not parties to the treaty and possess nuclear
weapons. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty and
claims to possess nuclear weapons. These states must be
brought into the treaty, and made accountable for
controlling their nuclear weapons and materials under
international safeguards. For the treaty to succeed these
states, along with the other nuclear weapons states, must
also become subject to transparent and verifiable nuclear
disarmament.
2. Set a timetable
and clear objectives in achieving nuclear
disarmament.
The
Non-Proliferation Treaty has been in effect for more than
three decades without substantial progress on the nuclear
disarmament provisions of the treaty's bargain. The only
way to assure that the nuclear weapons states achieve
their obligations in a timely way is to set a strict
timetable for achieving significant markers on the road
to complete nuclear disarmament.
3. Establish a
global inventory of nuclear weapons and
materials.
In order to control
nuclear weapons and materials, it is necessary to
ascertain accurately what exists. All states without
exception must be subject to reporting requirements and
international inspections in creating this
inventory.
4. Place all
nuclear weapons and materials under international
safeguards. Currently there are double standards in which
the civilian and nuclear weapons programs of the nuclear
weapons states are not subject to IAEA inspections and
safeguarding. These double standards must end and all
nuclear materials and weapons in all countries must be
accounted for and placed under international
safeguards.
5. Cease all
efforts to "improve" nuclear capabilities.
Currently the US
and other nuclear weapon states are seeking to develop
new and more usable nuclear weapons. This is another
example of double standards under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty that must be ended.
6. Criminalize both
horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
All efforts to
accomplish nuclear proliferation, whether by transfer of
weapons or materials or by improving and expanding
existing nuclear arsenals, should be criminalized and
treated as criminal violations of international law.
7. Provide security
assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.
An essential part
of the bargain for non-nuclear weapon states forgoing
their nuclear option is that they will not be subject to
nuclear attack by the existing nuclear weapon states.
These assurances must be reaffirmed in unequivocal
terms.
8. Commit to a No
First Use Policy.
All existing
nuclear weapon states should commit to not being first to
use nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapon states
and to bringing their nuclear policies into line with
this commitment.
9. Maintain the
current moratorium on nuclear testing.
All states should
maintain the current nuclear testing moratorium and
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if they have not
already done so. The US can take the lead by ceasing
preparations for resumption of nuclear testing within a
shorter timeframe and by closing its Nevada Test
Site.
10. Redirect
funding from developing and maintaining nuclear weapons
to dismantling them and safeguarding nuclear
materials.
Funding currently
directed to maintaining and improving nuclear arsenals
should be redirected to the goal of preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.
International efforts to inspect and safeguard nuclear
materials and weapons and to dismantle existing nuclear
arsenals require adequate funding to be successful.
Conclusion
Nuclear
proliferation cannot be halted without the nuclear
weapons states making serious, significant and sustained
moves toward nuclear disarmament. This means that nuclear
disarmament can no longer be placed on the back burner,
while attempting to halt proliferation by force. To
prevent proliferation, double standards must end and the
nuclear weapon states must engage with determination in
fulfilling their long overdue obligations to achieve
nuclear disarmament. A world safe from nuclear threat
will be a world without nuclear weapons or one moving
rapidly in this direction. It will also be one in which
all nuclear materials and weapons are under strict and
effective international controls. This requires a new way
of viewing security, one free of double standards. It is
a way made necessary by the need to prevent even a single
nuclear weapon or the materials to make one from falling
into the hands of non-state extremists who are not
subject to being deterred by threat of
retaliation.
Albert Einstein
said, somewhat enigmatically, "Imagination is more
important than knowledge." We can imagine what will
happen to our cities, to civilization and to life if we
fail to prevent nuclear weapons from proliferating and
being used. But can we summon the political will to
prevent these imaginable catastrophes caused by the
unleashing of nuclear weapons somewhere on earth from
destroying our collective future and causing untold
sorrow?
David Krieger is
president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
(www.wagingpeace.org).
He is the co-author of Nuclear Weapons and the World
Court.
© TFF and the author 2004

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