A
major step towards the
abolition of nuclear
weapons
By
Jonathan
Power
TFF Associate
since 1991
Comments directly
to JonatPower@aol.com
August 24, 2006
LONDON - Many of the great and the
good have dismissed the utility of nuclear weapons as
well as finding the idea of their use morally
indefensible but still they exist in enormous numbers in
the arsenals of the great powers.
Secretary of Defence Robert
McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk both came to be
convinced during their tenure in the Kennedy
administration that their use was "unthinkable".
President George H.W. Bush has written that in private he
ruled out a nuclear response during the 1991 Gulf War
although in public his Administration did not. General
Colin Powell, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in his autobiography recalls chiding his boss,
Dick Cheney, for even considering it.
Paul Nitze, one of the principal
architects of containing the Soviet Union by nuclear
deterrence, went even further. He argued in a Washington
Post article in 1994 that it was time to "junk" America's
nuclear dependence and rely instead on smart conventional
weapons.
But in the 12 years since the Nitze
article few analysts or senior officials have joined the
debate on whether or not precision conventional weapons
could do the job alone. But as Dennis Gormley argues in
the current issue of the quarterly journal of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, a careful
analysis of the reports by both government and think
tanks shows that conventional weapons can do anything
that a nuclear weapon might be called upon to do, and to
do it with less casualties and less political
fall-out.
Ironically, conservative as he was
in so many ways, it was President Ronald Reagan who tried
to seize this bull by the horns. In late 1986 at a summit
meeting with the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, he
offered to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles
within ten years, provided that each side would then be
free to deploy strategic missile defences. According to
Steve Andreasen, who has served in the White House as
Director of Defence Policy on the National Security
Council, Gorbachev said no. However a year later the two
presidents did agree to the more limited idea of
eliminating all intermediate range cruise and ballistic
missiles.
Reagan's' "zero ballistic missiles"
(ZBM) demands another look, particularly since the
element in the deal that the Soviets did not like,
missile defences, is already accepted. Of all disarmament
initiatives it is the one most easy to monitor and
implement. And it would abolish, as Andreasen writes,
"the most awesome weapon system ever devised". And yet to
placate the worriers it would leave nuclear-armed planes
and cruise missiles in place, whilst dealing with the
issue that President George W. Bush raised during his
first campaign for office, when he observed that the
dilemma of ballistic missiles was that, "for two nations
at peace keeping so many weapons on high alert may create
unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized
launch."
The beauty of the Reaganesque
proposal is that it can easily be grasped by both
politicians and public opinion. Most disarmament
proposals have involved labyrinthine negotiations through
the policy thickets.
A global ZBM would reduce the
incentive for either the U.S. or Russia to strike the
other first with nuclear weapons. It would reduce the
risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch and,
moreover, simplify the challenge for missile defences.
Most important, it would satisfy a craving that is
evident in much of American and Russian public opinion -
to take each other off the enemy's list. After all
neither side has ever fired a deadly shot in anger
against the other.
Needless to say, in the age of Bush
2, when pre-emption is now a doctrine, it would make it
impossible to pre-empt with nuclear weapons a threat from
a rogue state or terrorist group, which is why, from
Reagan on, proponents of ZBM put great of emphasis on
improving the accuracy and destructive potential of
conventional weapons.
Would Russia, China, Britain and
France agree? Russia would find that it would simplify
its strategic position. China would appear to lose out at
first sight. But it has never chosen to build up its
ballistic missile force against the U.S., which suggests
it could be persuaded to rely on aircraft for its Asian
defence. Britain and France would appear to be the big
losers but London and Paris must be persuaded that it
would be a major strategic gain to eliminate the threat
of total annihilation.
Besides, sooner or later, they both
have to face up to the big unanswered question: who do
they think they are ever going to use nuclear weapons
against? If Britain and France can't find the honest
answer to this question then no one can. They should not
be the ones who stand in the way of what would be a major
step forward towards the elimination of all nuclear
weapons.
Copyright © 2006 By
JONATHAN POWER
I can be reached by
phone +44 7785 351172 and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
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