An
important shift in Taiwanese
attitudes to China
By
Jonathan
Power
TFF Associate
since 1991
Comments to JonatPower@aol.com
April 18, 2006
LONDON - Perhaps one needs to be a
medieval theologian to understand the shifting nuances of
Taiwan's relationship with mainland China. Not one of
Taiwan's reigning, recent or likely future leaders is
consistent for long. China's leaders have long blown hot
and cold.
It would not matter if Taiwan were
simply a small island of 23 million people. But since it
is the largest single investor in mainland China, the
present principal source of China's technological
revolution and is claimed by Beijing as being part of
China, it is probably the world's most dangerous
potential flashpoint. If Taipei and Beijing spark each
off, as they did in 1996 when the U.S. sent two carrier
battle groups into the Taiwan Strait, then the U.S. could
be drawn into a war with China. Washington is irrevocably
committed to Taiwan's autonomy, as long as that is what
its people want. China, as its anti-secessionist law of
last year made clear, will not accept any Taiwanese move
towards independence.
Autonomy? Independence? They have
different shades of meaning depending on who mouths the
words.
The most important development in
this word game happened two weeks' ago when President
Chen publicly debated for over three hours with the
leader of the opposition, Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang
party, the polls' clear favourite to win the next
election. The international press all but ignored it, yet
it defined an important shift in cross party attitudes
towards the mainland.
Ma shedded old Kuomintang baggage
and confessed he thought the present "status quo", where
Taiwan resides in a political limbo, neither part of
China nor legally independent, is not unsatisfactory.
Chen appeared to back away from his pro independence
stance and declared himself open to an acceptance of a
"consensus" made in 1992 between China and the previous
Kuomintang government, if the opposition could get
China's president, Hu Jintao, to confirm it. Ma insists
that in the "consensus" China agreed to a formula which,
while maintaining there is only "one China", "each side
can have its own interpretation".
My own reading of the theology of
China-Taiwan is that Chen is more open than he has ever
been, that he has dropped his futile crusade to persuade
his electorate to vote for formal independence and
instead simply acts as if Taiwan is independent, which
indeed it is in most things, albeit not in terms of
diplomatic recognition. Likewise, it seems clear that not
only has Ma dropped the anachronistic Chiang Kai-shek
claim to rule over all of China, he has reversed his
Kuomintang predecessor's provocative policy of claiming a
"state-to-state" relationship. Thus the gap between the
two leaders and their parties, who have hitherto seemed
to be polar opposites, has been remarkably
reduced.
Nevertheless, Chen maintains as a
face-saver that he cannot not find any official
documentation to support the existence of the "1992
consensus".
Ma, for his part, appears to be
leaning over backwards, not to antagonise Chen's
supporters. In the TV debate he said he proposed "five
no's" and "five do's". Four of the five "no's" are a
reiteration of Chen's first inaugural address, namely,
that so long as mainland China has no intention of using
force against Taiwan the president would refrain from
declaring independence, changing the national name or
flag, incorporating the "state-to-state" theory of
cross-strait ties into the constitution or calling a
referendum on unification or independence. Ma's five
"dos" are: to resume consultations based on the "1992
consensus", to negotiate a 50 year peace pact, to
normalize trade and transportation links, to formulate a
framework for Taiwan to participate in international
organizations and to expand cross-strait tourism,
education and economic interaction.
All this makes a lot of sense. But
it could quickly be blown away if Beijing pulls the rug
from under Ma by reinterpreting the "1992 consensus".
Alternatively it could say "yes", that's how it is. This
would be a momentous breakthrough, ushering in the
promise of a settled relationship. Yesterday's meeting in
Beijing between Hu and senior Kuomintang politicians was
a crucial step towards defining China's attitude. After
it Hu said that China was behind the "1992 consensus",
although he did not add the crucial words, "each side can
have its own interpretation". However, he did add that
"we must resume talks on an equal footing", which some
analysts are suggesting amounts to the same
thing.
Ironically, if China does accept
Ma's interpretation, Chen (who after winning two terms
cannot stand again) and his yet unchosen successor as
party leader might well move up in the polls, claiming to
be the party that brought peace. For this reason alone
China might wait a while before making its position
clear.
Meanwhile, whatever happens in this
theological debate, the policy of the center holds - one
that most Taiwanese have got used to and like - the
present status quo. Neither one thing nor the other, but
it appears to work.
Copyright © 2006 By
JONATHAN POWER
I can be reached by
phone +44 7785 351172 and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
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