Washington
is reaping what
it helped sow in Pakistan
By
Jonathan
Power
February 16, 2004
LONDON - When last week Pakistan's chief nuclear
weapons' scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted his role
in sharing nuclear weapons' technology with rogue regimes
he not only highlighted the wilful blindness of his own
government to his activities but in effect that of the
U.S. as well.
It is the old, sad story, of the powers-that-be in
Washington not seeing the big picture, of trying to take
short cuts for the sake of political expediency and, in
the Cold War days, of having an ultra-reactive reflex to
all and everything Moscow did.
In April 1979 the Carter Administration, convinced
that Pakistan was secretly building a nuclear weapon,
suspended military aid. But that December it reversed
itself, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and
persuaded Congress to authorize a large arms aid program.
For the next decade, in return for Pakistan's help in
building up the mujahadin fighters in Afghanistan, who
later turned into Osama bin Laden's storm troopers,
Washington put its telescope to its blind eye.
It was an ill conceived policy from the very
beginning. Why, after the Soviet invasion, was it
considered that Pakistan had Washington by the tail and
could get away with anything? Surely it should have been
the other way round, with Pakistan on its knees begging
for all the help it could get on any terms America chose?
Pakistan didn't want the Soviets in Afghanistan for its
own good reasons and, indeed, began supplying aid to the
mujahadin before the first American shipments
arrived.
Washington had whipped itself into hysteria over the
Soviet move with strategists arguing, in the over the top
manner that was used in the run up to war with Iraq, that
if Moscow was not stopped the Red Army Blitzkrieg was
going to keep on rolling right across Afghanistan, down
through Iran, and up to the oil terminals on the Persian
Gulf.
No matter that in reality Soviet troops found it
difficult to get past the third mountain range after
Kabul, and if their real purpose in entering Afghanistan
was to reach the Gulf and the apparently much-needed
"warm water" port they could have driven directly through
Iran without detouring through inhospitable
Afghanistan.
Moreover, America's embrace of Pakistan had dire
domestic repercussions, triggering within Pakistan the
rise of religious extremism, until then a moderate Muslim
state. Facing domestic resistance to its alliance with
the U.S. the regime of Mohammed Zia ul Haq forged
alliances with Sunni extremists groups in a
counterproductive attempt to undermine its secular
opponents. It led to the distortion of Pakistan's legal
system and provided the clergy with unprecedented access
to political power. This was the time that the government
began to pour in funds to the madrasas, the religious
schools, which indoctrinated and trained recruits for not
just the military's interventionist policies in
Afghanistan but also in Indian Kashmir.
Only in 1990 did President George Bush senior end the
annual White House lie of giving assurances to Congress
that all was well in Pakistan's nuclear laboratories.
Military sales were terminated. But then a short four
years later the Clinton administration developed the
endearing notion of "grandfathering". The idea was that
the Administration couldn't do much about the situation
it inherited and as long as Pakistan promised to cap (but
not roll back) its current nuclear program, Washington
would authorize the sale of state-of-the-art F16s (that
could be reconfigured to carry nuclear weapons).By then,
believe it or not, Washington had good evidence that
Pakistan was helping Iran develop its bomb.
Enter India. In probably the most foolish decision
ever made in Indian politics the government of Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided in 1998 to go
public with India's secret nuclear weapons' program and
tested its first nuclear bomb. Shortly after Pakistan did
the same.
Washington reacted once again. All aid to both
Pakistan and India was suspended. Later, President
Clinton even refused to shake General Pervez
Musharraf's hand when they met. Washington was aghast at
the coup he had engineered, the world's first in a
nuclear-armed nation.
But September 11th changed everything. Washington
needed Pakistan again and indeed Musharraf felt he had no
choice but to fall into line on the threat of severe
punishment. Yet within months Pakistan cleverly got
Washington by the tail again, or so it appears. In 2002
Washington learnt that a Pakistani plane was picking up
missile components in North Korea, presumably in a barter
deal for nuclear weapons technology. But nothing was done
to rock the relationship with Musharraf. Now once more,
despite the new revelations, nothing appears to be being
done.
Washington's options in punishing Pakistan seemingly
are now foreclosed, as long as the fight against Al Qaeda
and the Taliban continues. It is a tragedy that today's
U.S. administration is reaping the whirlwind from
mistakes made by its predecessors. But in other areas of
policy are not similar myopic decisions laying up demons
that will ambush future administrations?
I can be reached by phone +44
7785 351172 and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
Copyright © 2004 By
JONATHAN POWER
Follow this
link to read about - and order - Jonathan Power's book
written for the
40th Anniversary of
Amnesty International
"Like
Water on Stone - The Story of Amnesty
International"
Tell a friend about this article
Send to:
From:
Message and your name
 
|