In
dealing with the Middle East
the U.S. is as bad
as the British were
By
Jonathan
Power
June 10, 2002
LONDON - Quite some time before Adolph Hitler had
decided to exterminate the Jews the British political
establishment had sadly concluded, twenty years after the
Balfour Declaration of 1917, that they had made a mistake
in allowing the Zionist movement to drag them into the
enterprise of re-making a Jewish homeland in what for 700
years, until the break up of the Ottoman empire in the
wake of Turkey's defeat in World War 1, had been Muslim
territory. One certainly doesn't have to be anti-Semitic
to wonder, in retrospect, whether the founding of Israel
on Palestinian soil was such a good idea.
The Jews had begun to settle in Palestine in the late
nineteenth century at a time when "life proceeded slowly
at a pace set by the stride of the camel", to quote Tom
Segev's marvellous book, "One Palestine, Complete". But
it was only after the British foreign secretary Stanley
Balfour, strongly backed by prime minister Lloyd George,
a religious man who saw the Jewish cause as one that must
be supported by Christian charity, issued his declaration
that the government "views with favour" the aspiration
for a Jewish "national home", that the settlement of Arab
land was begun in earnest. A Jewish Palestine for the
British was never an economic investment, nor a strategic
one. At best it was an emotional cause, at its worse an
adventure. The next generation of British politicians and
colonial administrators, faced with a bloody Arab revolt
that they had to mercilessly repress, felt that Lloyd
George and Balfour had made an awful faux pas.
In 1936, eleven years before the UN voted for the
partition of Palestine, (with the U.S. and the Soviet
Union for and Britain abstaining) the British had come up
with their own plan for partition. Lord Peel, a former
secretary of state for India, headed the commission of
inquiry. It seemed that after 20 years of resistance
London had given in to Arab pressure. By today's
standards it was a good deal. The Arabs would receive the
west bank of the Jordan River, the mountainous region and
the desert to the south. The Jews would receive Tel Aviv,
the coastal plain, the northern valleys and part of
Galilee. The British would retain Jerusalem.
But the Arabs didn't want partition- they could not
bear to see part of their country handed over to Jewish
sovereignty and, besides, they never forgot that before
the Balfour Declaration, during the fight against the
Turks, the British had promised them Palestine. Neither
did many of the Jews, although its leadership, in
particular Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, were
mainly for it, since it would bring about a Jewish state.
(The latter confided it would be only the first step to
one day creating a "greater Israel" on both sides of the
Jordan river.)
In the end, in a grave act of cowardice, the British
shelved the Peel recommendations, partly because of the
local opposition and partly because London couldn't
stomach the commission's recommendation of "population
transfers", what today would be called "ethnic
cleansing".
But by refusing to bite on that bullet, the British
had to face down even more Arab violence than before,
then Jewish violence, all the while favouring the Zionist
endeavour of settling increasing numbers of Jewish
immigrants. When the British left it was inevitable the
Arabs would fight. It was also inevitable that the Jews
would win.
Fifty-five years later we wring our hands over the
intractability of the Middle East. Yet in two very
important ways we have come a long way. The Arabs- or at
least an overwhelming majority of the leaders- now accept
there should be partition and a Jewish state. A majority
of Jewish Israelis- when the suicide bombers are taken
out of the equation- accept there should be an
independent and mainly contiguous Palestine. And, as the
former French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, argued
earlier this week in the Washington Post, if we look not
at the Camp David negotiations but at the subsequent ones
at Sharm el Sheikh and Taba we all but have a 100%
agreement.
Today the Americans play the role of the British and
are seemingly playing it not much better. Like the
British, when in doubt, they support the Zionists. Like
the British, they probably fear the damage that those on
the right of the Zionist spectrum could cause if they
feel thwarted- perhaps even an attempt at assassination
of the American president. Yet the centre is rather
strong: enough blood has gone under the bridge that a
majority on both sides knows what the compromise solution
has to be. Therefore, as Vedrine argues, President George
Bush "should impose a peace settlement" and ride out the
reaction of the extremists on the fringes of both sides."
Time is running out", writes Vedrine. "What other
solutions are there?"
It was unfortunate, to say the least, that the British
twice-promised this piece of the Ottoman Empire. But now,
despite the violence, we could be in sight of a "promised
land" for both Arab and Jew. Today, not tomorrow, is the
day to make it happen.
I can be reached by phone +44
7785 351172 and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
Copyright © 2002 By
JONATHAN POWER
Follow this
link to read about - and order - Jonathan Power's book
written for the
40th Anniversary of
Amnesty International
"Like
Water on Stone - The Story of Amnesty
International"
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