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Israel
and the Palestinians:
A
sinking ship
By JONATHAN
POWER
June 20, 2001
LONDON - One can only marvel at the tenacity of those who
make a living in Europe and North America commentating,
advising, and, if they are members of an official
government delegation, negotiating the Israeli-Palestine
issue.
A year after the failure of Camp David and the
beginning of the second Intifada they continue to beaver
away, convinced a dam to tide the onslaught of violence
can still be constructed, that an interim agreement or
two can replace the high hopes of a final settlement,
that the most brutal general in Israel's blood-filled
history, Ariel Sharon, now prime minister, can be
dissuaded from the use of his iron fists, and that Yasser
Arafat, the ruthless, egomaniacal Palestinian president
can forever ride the tiger of the Arab street and somehow
placate it while signing on for half of what he rejected
for understandable reasons a year ago.
The deal almost negotiated at Taba in Egypt after the
first few months of the Intifada was in many ways
remarkable: a Palestinian state to control 95% of the
West Bank and Gaza; Israeli settlers to be concentrated
on about 5% of the land which Israel would annex with
Palestine being compensated with Israeli land in the
Negev desert; the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem,
including those in the Old City to be absorbed by
Palestine; the Haram Al-Sharif Mosque to be under
Palestinian sovereignty and the Wailing Wall under
Israeli; and Palestinian refugees to be either
compensated with money, settled in Palestine or, on a
case by case basis, in Israel.
If it was remarkable- in comparison with what had gone
before - it was also insufficient. Arafat decided not to
sign and indeed decided to stand back from giving any
show of support to prime minister Ehud Barak even though
it was obvious that the outcome could only be Sharon's
electoral victory.
One can make a dozen plausible arguments why this was
a profound strategic mistake. If Arafat had shaken hands
on a deal he might have risked his life from an
assassination attempt but, presuming he has long ago
discounted this ever present threat, he could have built
on the deal to secure all manner of improvements in the
following months, not least blackmailing both the
Americans and the Europeans for development funds by
threatening to turn tail.
For Barak's part, having come so far - and he went
further than President Bill Clinton thought he should go
at Camp David - he could have gone the extra mile and
raised the ceiling from 20% to 25% for the percentage of
the population of Israel that could be Arab, (an extra
250,000 people), thus taking a great part of the sting
out of Arafat's push on the resettlement of refugees.
The final compromises didn't happen and even if they
had it might not have turned the tide. Barak could still
have been defeated by an electorate that thought he had
gone too far- although it would have been a close race
rather than the landslide that consumed him. Arafat,
finding himself hung out to dry after having said yes and
then having to deal with Sharon who said no, would have
been more than a laughing joke throughout the Arab
world.
The truth was the compromises came too late. For all
Barak's magnanimity in the final year, he had wasted
precious time early on in his term attempting to settle
with Syria first and taking an inordinate amount of time
to withdraw from the Lebanon.
All this suggests that in better circumstances a deal
of this kind could be pulled off. The questions is what
happens in the meantime? It is difficult to believe that
Sharon's polices can lead anywhere useful. Continuing to
build settlements on Arab land is provocative beyond
belief. Always a counterproductive ploy, nothing does
more to inflame Arab opinion. To believe that Arafat or
any other leader can temper the violence of his people in
this situation is nothing less than self-righteous
make-believe, perhaps the worst of all political
sins.
Its only outcome is likely to be the continuing quiet
exodus of Israel's younger, highly educated people,
particularly those in the important new technology
businesses (which today contributes over 25% of Israel's
GNP) to calmer pastures. Even today as many as 30,000
Israeli's live in San Francisco's South Bay alone. The
young Jews of today who do not feel the fear of their
fathers about living in the European or American Diaspora
do not want to bring up their families inside a barbed
wire fence. Yet it is the educated in Israel who have
always produced the backbone of the peace vote (along
with Israeli Arabs who make up an enormous 40% of it).
Diminished in size already it is destined to shrink even
further.
Moreover, in the face of further conflict and
hostility from the Arab world the intransigence of Sharon
will grow. It is Sharon who argued in the 1980s that the
Palestinians should be relocated inside Jordan. This and
similar arguments are likely to become more popular and
more acceptable (inside Israel) in the future.
From the day of the Balfour Declaration the
Arab-Palestinian dispute has long looked irresolvable.
After the high hopes of the Oslo accord it looks more
problematic than ever. Both sides are now destined to
travel through the long dark night of the soul. Frankly,
as a family man, be I a Palestinian or an Israeli, I
would try to get out.
I can be reached by phone +44
7785 351172 and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
Copyright © 2001 By
JONATHAN POWER
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