The War in
Chechnya Highlights Russia's Growing Regional
Dilemna
By JONATHAN
POWER
Oct. 27, 1999
LONDON- The new war in Chechnya is becoming as pointless,
self-defeating and counterproductive as the one before. Now
that the peace agreement that was stitched together in time
for the last presidential election is undone no one, not
even General Alexander Lebed, President Boris Yeltsin's last
saviour, will be able to put Humpty Dumpty together
again.
Yet even if this war does rumble eternally on; even if,
as reported, the Moslem fanatics from Afghanistan, the
Taliban, are sending their young fighters to the
anti-Russian cause, the threat it poses to Russia as a whole
is minimal. The real danger to the integrity of Russia lies
not in this super- obstreperous, but quite tiny region, but
in its own massive size, that bridges eight time zones. Any
system less centralised than that of the tsars or the
communist dicatatorship poses enormous, complicated and
unresolved problems of governance.
As Martin Nicholson, a former adviser on Russian affairs
to the British cabinet office, put it in a recent paper
written for the International Institute for Strategic
Studies,"The rise of regional power in post Soviet Russia is
a break with the country's centralised past almost as
dramatic as the collapse of communism".
The Russian Federation is not that much less than the
size of the Soviet Union. It still remains the world's
largest country. The bits that dropped off, from Estonia to
the Ukraine to Kazakstan, have made only a fractional
reduction to its massive bulk. But what is left is
remarkably homogeneous. Despite the country's many
nationalities, Russians, together with Russified Ukranians
and Belorussians make up around 82% of the population.
National minorities living in "their" republics, as in
Chechnya, account for less than 10% of the population. More
Chechnyas hellbound on separation whatever the cost in blood
and treasure are hard to imagine.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to discern powerful
currents towards regionalism, which if not checked, are
going to make nonsense of Russia as one nation. Although
elected, many regional leaders tend to shun the details of
democracy, either co-opting or neutralising their
legislatures. Working hand in glove with local business
barons and vested interests the privatisation process has
been effectively hijacked leading to small, tightly
controlled, agglomerations of economic and political
power.
The federal judiciary has been weakened and local courts
are often subject to pressure from regional authorities.
Regional political bosses have worked to inhibit the
development of national political parties. Likewise, the
regional media is effectively under local political control.
Unlike in the days of the Soviet Union, there is now only
one national newspaper and one television channel that reach
into the provinces.
The danger of such a process is that it leads to moribund
societies. If there is little room for the contest of free
ideas, there is even less for free economic competition. At
the extreme, much of Russia could become like it already has
in parts of the Russian Far East - a mafia kingdom, mired in
falling living standards, almost zero investment both
domestic and foreign, and mindless parochialism, ignoring
the calls from Moscow for change and reform.
Fortunately, throughout most of Russia there still remain
centripetal forces to help offset the centrifugal ones.
Central fiscal control, for example, is still maintained.
The security forces do not support separatism. Many of the
more important regional politicos aspire to national roles
and are attempting, as is often done in the U.S., to use
their local base to leapfrog into national power. Moreover,
on a number of occasions, new regional leaders have worked
as a stabilising influence within the Russian body politic
at a time of political crisis, in particular on the occasion
of Yeltsin's confrontation with the Duma, the national
parliament. Democracy still has its say too. Six incumbent
governors were defeated in the eight elections held in the
first half of last year.
Yet if Russia is to effectively survive, its president
and parliament urgently need to put in place some kind of
more rational and comprehensive federal system. Yeltsin,
fearful of upsetting a precariously based applecart, has
shied away from the challenge, preferring bilateral deals
with the various regions, which have not added up either to
a coherent logic or a consistent policy. A revamped federal
deal is just as important for the long run as the other two
pillars of post Soviet reform- the introduction of democracy
and the market economy.
What Russia's next president will have to give priority
to after the election next July is the design and
implementation of such federal arrangements. It must make
for a clear division of powers between the centre and the
regions, involving in particular economic decision making
and the courts. It must impose a unified budget and taxation
system common to all regions.
Russia, despite Chechnya, is not only at peace with the
outside world but with most of itself. A time when there are
no external threats to Russia is a good time for Russia to
spend its political energies looking inward. Getting its
internal balance right is of fundamental importance if it is
to progress.
Copyright © 1999 By JONATHAN POWER
I can be reached by phone +44 385 351172 and e-mail:
JonatPower@aol.com
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