This Is the
Right Time to Wrap Up the War
By JONATHAN
POWER
May 19, 1999
LONDON- The only good thing about this war with
Yugoslavia is that no Nato soldier has been killed in
combat. This makes the compromise now necessary to quickly
end this counterproductive enterprise much more easy to
realize.
Thucydides listed three causes of war--interest, fear and
honour. They still hold in the twentieth century. Honour was
central to Britain's single minded determination to win
World War 1. Once blood had been shed it would have been
considered a betrayal not to revenge those who had already
died for the cause. Likewise, it is why the American people
rallied behind Roosevelt once their honour had been insulted
in Pearl Harbour.
Fortunately for Nato this time round there is no honour
at stake, yet. Passions are not aroused. There is only blood
on the floor on one side of the room. Public opinion is not
intensely engaged. Indeed, if anything western opinion is
gradually withdrawing its initial support. It has seen one
bad bombing error after another taking scores of innocent
lives each time. Moreover, there is a growing awareness that
Nato has made the refugee crisis much worse than it might
otherwise have been and, added to that, the war has taken a
serious toll on relations with China and Russia. Right now
it is the Yugoslavians who are most motivated to defend
their honour.
"No one starts a war" wrote Clausewitz, "or rather no one
in his senses ought to do so, without first being clear what
he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to
conduct it." By this measure Nato has already miserably
failed. Moreover, as the doyen of war historians, Michael
Howard, has put it, "the history of warfare should have
taught political leaders one painful lesson: victories on
the battlefield, however overwhelming, do not necessarily
lead to a lasting peace, as the aftermath of the Gulf War
has made very clear. Even Napoleon's spectacular victories
produced political settlements that were no more than
truces."
At least Napoleon's individual battles were decisive. But
since then the occasions of a single decisive battle have
been rare indeed. It is not just a question of vanquishing
an army but the need to crush the will of the people. In the
First World War this was not done despite the immense
quantities of blood spilt in grinding trench warfare, and
Hitler was easily able to rouse the German people, who felt
they had been mistreated by the victorious allies, for a
second effort. The Second World War was only decisive
because the vanquished were able to accept the verdict of
battle. Part of it certainly was the degree of punishment
inflicted on Germany ande Japan but the other part was the
work of statesmen and diplomats. The allies went out of
their way to make these countries partners, both economic
and political, in operating the new international order. And
they found and trusted new leaders who both commanded the
support of their own people and who were prepared to
cooperate with their conquerors.
Are Nato leaders aware how far is the distance they will
have to travel if they want to finish the journey they have
embarked upon? Those who thought a week's bombing would do
the trick were profoundly ignorant of history's lessons. It
should be obvious by now--although it was from the
beginning--that Yugoslavia will fight every inch of the way
to preserve its hold over at least northern Kosovo, the
heartland of the ancient Serb churches.
The question Nato has to confront is this: is it prepared
to spend vast sums in both blood and treasure bringing
Yugoslavia to its knees and then spending equally vast sums
on re-building what it has destroyed, and then more?
Nato has to be clear about this latter point in
particular before it procedes to wreck the country.
Nato should come to its senses before it spills the blood
of its servicemen and new thinking becomes much more
difficult. It should announce it is prepared to consider the
partition of Kosovo. To make it palatable to the
Yugoslavians they should be told the West no longer has any
objection to them incorporating the Serbian parts of Bosnia
into one unified country. To make it appealing to the
Kosovars they should be told they can join up their part
with Albania in a unified country. To pull the sting of the
Albanians who live in Macedonia they should be told the West
will pay for them to relocate to the new country if they
wish to. (Most won't as they have a satisfactory economic
and political status in relatively liberal minded
Macedonia.)
All the Balkan states, new and old, should then be put on
the fast track towards associate membership of the European
Union. If the war stops the West can spend on that what is
being compelled to budget for war.
Few wars any longer are decided on the battlefield. They
are decided at the peace table. Even military victories do
not determine the outcome of wars. They merely provide
political opportunities for victors. Thus, the smartest
thing to do in a situation like this is to take those
political opportunities before real blood is spilt. In fact,
if the West does not aim for a solution that takes into
account the honour of the people it wishes to defeat it is
unlikely--even if there were a land invasion and total
military victory--to decide anything for very long. Nato
leaders could save themselves and everyone else a lot of
unnecessary pain and suffering if they could see that
now.
Copyright © 1999 By JONATHAN POWER
I can be reached by phone +44 385 351172 and e-mail:
JonatPower@aol.com
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