The 1990
Blueprint for Dealing With Saddam
is Unsuitable for 1998
By JONATHAN POWER
LONDON-- The war hero Antoine de St.
Exupery, better known to most of us as the author of the
children's classic, Le Petit Prince, wrote in his
autobiographical novel, "Flight to Arras", about the rigours
of air combat, some lines that President Bill Clinton could
usefully reflect on: "Orders are given for the sacrifice of
the air arm because war must be made to look like war. And
nobody admits meanwhile that this war looks like nothing at
all. That no part of it makes sense. That not a single
blueprint fits the circumstances".
Mr. Clinton's profound mistake is that he
has acted all along as if he were back in 1990, in George
Bush's shoes at the time of the Gulf War, threatened by a
military monster armed with weapons of mass destruction. And
now that he's raised the flag, the momentum of superpower
ego is pushing him into a war that at best cannot offer a
clear-cut victory and at worst might careen badly off the
rails.
Saddam Hussein is not being
confrontational because he is strong, as he was eight years
ago. He is being difficult and provocative because he is
weak. Saddam Hussein no longer has the power to invade
Kuwait or threaten Saudi Arabia. The most dangerous thing he
can do to the outside world is to make life unpleasant for a
few hundred unarmed UN inspectors.
His military machine is cut in half.
He no longer has a navy to speak of. He has lost half his
planes. A large number of his tanks are inoperable and 50%
of all his military equipment lacks spares. His nuclear
weapons program has been totally dismantled and most of his
rockets destroyed. His economy is in the most terrible
straits. As for his biological and chemical weapons we have
not had an honest debate about exactly what he has got and
what he could do with them.
Chemical weapons have been attributed
a potency out of all proportion to their military value. In
the Middle East they have earned their macabre reputation
only because their victims were defenceless Kurds in Iraqi
villages and unprotected soldiers during Iraq's long war
with Iran--Iranian soldiers refused to shave their beards
and their masks didn't seal tightly.
It is a misnomer to describe chemical
weapons as a "poor man's nuclear weapon". Even for an
unprotected population a large-scale chemical attack would
have less impact than a small atomic bomb. Moreover, while
there is no defence against a nuclear device a city
population can be given masks. And since a major chemical
weapons bombardment of a sizeable city would have to be
staggered it should be possible to evacuate much of the
population before the casualties are overwhelming.
Biological weapons ARE something to
worry about, but in the future more than today. Present day
ones as developed by Iraqi scientists are quite primative,
deadly though they can be if used against unprotected
civilians. But if they were used on a large scale with
present means of delivery in a battlefield situation they
would be nothing less than suicidal, rebounding on Iraq's
own army and people. Doubtless one day Iraq could overcome
the problem of weaponising pathogens and toxins and
inserting them into effective delivery vehicles that would
have a devastating effect against an opposing army. But this
is to demand a level of expertise of the highest order and,
even without the pressures of the world embargo, must be
some years away.
This is why dealing with Saddam today
is a question of opinion and judgment. Not of hyping up the
danger and invoking the right to self-defence under Article
51 of the UN Charter as if America was about to be invaded.
Saddam is no longer an imminent threat
as he was in 1990, but at the same time his wings need to
remain clipped. On this there is a concensus in the Security
Council and this concensus is America's best ally. To break
it unilaterally would be foolhardy. The Security Council is
not like a rubber band that will bounce back into shape once
it has been pulled in a distorted direction. It may just not
function the next time America needs it.
On legal grounds Washington simply
doesn't have a case. Resolution 687 of the Security Council
that confirmed the cease-fire deal with Iraq at the end of
the Gulf War gives no authority for one Security Council
member unilaterally to start up hostilities again. That
would require as it did last time a fresh resolution similar
to 678 passed in 1990 that authorized "all necessary means"
to roll back the invasion of Kuwait.
Saddam can't be outmanoeuvred by some
White House blueprint borrowed from the very different
circumstances of 1990. But he can be by diplomatic guile as
long as the Security Council remains united and the economic
and military boycott remains firmly in place. And one
important ingredient in maintaining that concensus is for
Washington once and for all, without the ambiguity of
previous occasions, to make plain that sanctions on Iraq
will be lifted if the work of the UN inspectors is allowed
to procede until they've completed their task. This Bill
Clinton has conspicuously failed to pledge. And that is at
least half of the present problem.
February 18, 1998, LONDON
Copyright © 1998 By JONATHAN POWER
Note: I can be reached by phone +44 385 351172; fax
+44 374 590493;
and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
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