New Dangers
of Nuclear War on
Indian Sub-Continent
By JONATHAN POWER
VIENNA, Austria--On the last day of
last month India used its own domestically produced rocket
to hurl into orbit a large satellite. Within days the
newspapers were full of new Indian-Pakistani gun duels over
the bitterly disputed territory of Kashmir. It was all
coincidence, but a telling one.
No place on earth is more likely to
spark a nuclear war than Kashmir. And the rapid progress
being made by both Pakistan and India on rocket development
brings that final day of sub-continental Armagaddon
dangerously closer.
Until recently it could be argued that
the relatively primitive state of the nuclear-bomb art in
both Pakistan and India meant they have engaged in a form of
deterrence that the local experts call "recessed." In other
words, their limited nuclear capabilities are not
destabilizing-- there is no pressing need, now that both
have low-level nuclear armories, to join an arms race of
nuclear testing, pre-emption strategies and nuclear
targetting.
Moreover, the nuclear proponents
maintain, although the two countries may bluster, in
practice their conflicts are almost ritualized. In the fifty
years since they gained their independence they have fought
three wars. The last two in 1965 and 1971 were concluded
within two weeks and both civilian and battlefield
casualties were light. Anyway, say the Indian strategists in
a final point, the real enemy we confront with nuclear
weapons is China.
But what kind of game are these
nuclear thinkers playing? To take just the last argument:
India is deceiving itself if it believes it can deter China
this way. While China could wipe out practically every
Indian city, India could only pinprick China in retaliation.
The Indian nuclear bomb is no deterrent against china and
vis a vis Pakistan is only a provocation that adds to
Pakistani fears--fears that are touched with an edge of
paranoia--that they are compelled always to play David to
India's Goliath.
Pakistan's strategists have always
worried about Indian armored columns punching it across the
plains. The Pakistani nuclear bomb on which work started a
good two years before India's first nuclear test in 1974,
according to a new study by Neil Joeck, recently published
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is
meant more to remedy a perceived situation of inferiority
than to be a building block in a sophisticated game, a la
superpowers, of stable nuclear deterrence.
Indeed, this is the central
issue--having developed a small nuclear arsenal, how do the
two countries stabilize the situation? The superpower
theorists have long argued that stability is not possible
unless there is an assured second-strike capability. In
other words, if you attack me my retaliatory arsenal is so
secure that I will be able to take revenge, however much
damage you inflict upon me in your first strike.
Neither India and Pakistan have the
wherewithall, as the superpowers did, to develop and build
such second-strike capability. Therefore, the temptation in
a period of rising tension "to use them or lose them"
becomes very attractive, for it would undoubtedly bring
capitulation by the other side.
Thus, the Indo-Pakistani nuclear
stand-off has always been perceived by outsiders as
inherently unstable. Now, to add to this instability, is the
slow but steady introduction of ballistic missiles. They may
not yet be configured for nuclear weapons, but it is only a
matter of time before both sides do so. The short flight
time of rockets, the inability to recall them once launched
and the need to delegate command will put both sides on a
hair-trigger.
The danger then is that Kashmiri
insurgents and unofficial government representatives, who
are apt at winding up a state of high tension in the region,
in effect have their hand on this trigger. Together with
such shortcomings as limited intelligence and the
over-concentration of decision-making in a small circle,
that is a recipe for nuclear war. Both countries have
together created a situation where they can no longer be
certain where their security lies.
The remedy must be with the stronger
party. Only if India starts the ball rolling on nuclear
disarmament would Pakistan even consider the issue.
Unilateral nuclear disarmament has happened before. Belarus,
Kazakstan, South Africa and the Ukraine have eliminated
their nuclear stockpiles. Argentina and Brazil have reversed
their bomb-building programmes.
India should be encouraged to take the
first step. The bait should be the offer of an Indian place
on the UN Security Council and a seat at the table with the
G7, the grouping of the world's most industrially advanced
nations. The bait for Pakistan would be India's agreement to
the plebicite on the ownership of Kashmir demanded by the UN
in the 1950s.
October 29, 1997,
VIENNA
Copyright © 1997 By JONATHAN POWER
Note: I can be reached by phone +44 385 351172
and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
|