New U.S. Arms
for South America
Is a Bad Idea
By JONATHAN POWER
LONDON-- We should indeed "cry for Argentina," in fact
for all of Latin America, when the news, apparently
imminent, is announced that the Clinton administration has
decided to remove long-standing U.S. restrictions on selling
high-tech weapons to South American countries.
Just at the moment that South America, after years of
slithering and sliding, has finally got itself out of the
mud of economic malaise, its spendthrift generals supposedly
relegated to the outer fringes of decision making, this
change in American policy could throw the balance of power
between civilian and military in exactly the wrong
direction. The last thing the generals need to be tempted by
are expensive items of once forbidden fruit.
Take Argentina--although only in degree is it possessor
of a worse record in destabilising military interference
than its neighbours. The last time western arms salesmen
were regularly satisfying every whim of South American
generals the country picked a quite unnecessary fight with
Britain over ownership of the off-shore Falkland/Malvinas
Islands. Nevermind that it was, as one astute observer of
the time noted, "two bald men fighting over a comb," it was
a high-tech war, only surpassed, quite a few years later, by
the Gulf War. I remember a small group of us being briefed
in London by the rather well-informed deputy director of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Colonel
Jonathan Alford. "Given Argentina's massive armoury," he
warned, "with its state-of-the-art French Exocet missiles
together with its geographical advantages the outcome is
going to swing on electronics. On this Britain might just
have the edge." It did, just.
It was a futile war that won Argentina nothing but shame.
Its only virtue was to totally discredit Argentina's
military junta whose bloated military budget was out of
proportion to other government spending, way out of line
with the country's economic resources and one of the major
contributors to rapid inflation and government mismanagement
that had been Argentina's lot since the days of Juan and
Evita Peron. There was, in short, a lot to cry about.
The Latin American world has changed beyond all
recognition the last few years. Military regimes have fallen
by the wayside, although in Peru, Colombia and Chile they
still wield a disproportionate influence and hold on to a
dangerous degree of autonomy. Democracy is now widespread,
if in many cases the institutions of government remain
imperfectly formed. Economic self-discipline, after years of
painful adjustment, is today producing dividends that offer
the continent the chance of doing what it had long promised
itself, of being as successful as east Asia. (Chile already
is and it shouldn't be forgotten that until a decade ago
Brazil held number one spot as the fastest growing economy
of the century, even ahead of Taiwan.)
One important sign--both facilitator and consequence--of
the maturing of Latin America has been the fall in military
budgets. South Americans this century, unlike other regions
of the world, have more talked about war than actually
practised it--Brazil, its largest country, hasn't been to
war since 1870. Now at last this is showing up in the budget
statistics--even the need to posture is being shelved.
Thus, one assumes, President Bill Clinton must have very
good reasons, outside the need to make money for the
American arms industry, to upset this apple-cart. But what
are they?
The guerrilla insurgencies that during the Cold War
provided a national security rationale for a military
dominance have in the majority of cases ended. One
kidnapping in Peru by a marginal group does not a mighty
insurrection make. The rapid dismantling of tariff barriers
and the pace of economic growth is making "hard" political
boundaries rather "soft."
So why then should South America be hungry for new arms?
The White House spokesman earlier this month answered it
this way: "The arrival of democracy in all but one of the
countries in the region changes the environment in which
some of our existing policies might apply"--which is about a
contrary, not to say facile, answer as one could get.
Having engineered for themselves such a profound change
in their political and economic culture the last thing the
South Americans need are super war machines, perhaps (as now
with Thailand), even Amraams, the over-the-horizon,
air-to-air missile.
Privately, most of the new-breed civilian leaders want to
be relieved of pressures from their militaries, not have to
watch their imaginations being fed by shiny things to buy.
All the continent's leaders, to a greater or lesser extent,
are struggling to exercise their authority over the
military. The balance on their internal see-saw has only
recently tipped in their favor. Only gradually are they
building up the muscle to reduce bloated state budgets, of
which the military have had more than their fair share.
This, most of them know, is the only way to enable
deep-rooted structural reform that will reduce inflation
(which invariably hurts the doer most), attract foreign
investment and allow an overdue step up in basic services,
safe-drinking water, sanitation, health provision, education
and housing, that the poorest desperately need.
Mr. Clinton needs to ask himself on which side in the
struggle between civilian sobriety and military profligacy
is he actually on?
January 22,
1997, LONDON
Copyright © 1997 By JONATHAN POWER
Note: I can be reached by phone +44 385 351172
and e-mail: JonatPower@aol.com
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