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The
Bush Administration's Nuclear Policies
and
the Response of Citizens
By
David
Krieger
President, The
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
TFF
associate
The Bush administration came into office with the
clear intention to strengthen US military dominance,
including its nuclear dominance, and it has been true to
this major policy goal. While the Bush administration
views nuclear weapons as central to US security, it has a
larger vision of US military dominance as a principal
means for serving US national security interests. The
administration has shown scant concern for US treaty
obligations, particularly in the area of arms control.
Most prominently, the administration has disavowed the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, arguing it is no
longer relevant in a post-Cold War environment.
The US Nuclear Posture
Review
The clearest statement of US nuclear policy can be
found in the administration‚s Nuclear Posture Review
Report, a classified document mandated by Congress, which
was leaked to the press in March 2002. This report lays
out a "New Triad,"composed of offensive strike systems
(nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (active and passive),
and a revitalized defense infrastructure to meet emerging
threats. The old strategic triad of land-based missiles,
sea-based missiles and long-range bombers now fits into
the nuclear branch of the New Triad‚s offensive
strike systems.
The Nuclear Posture Review states, "Nuclear weapons
play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the
United States, its allies and friends. They provide
credible military options to deter a wide range of
threats, including WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] and large-scale conventional military
force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique
properties that give the United States options to hold at
risk classes of targets [that are] important
strategic and political objectives." This is an
extraordinary admission of the benefits that US leaders
attribute to nuclear weapons in US defense policy,
benefits that they are clearly reserving for themselves
and a small group of other nuclear weapons states.
The report also finds utility in the use of nuclear
weapons under certain circumstances: "Nuclear weapons
could be employed against targets able to withstand a
non-nuclear attack (for example, deep underground bunkers
or bio-weapon facilities)." The report further calls for
development of contingency plans for the use of nuclear
weapons against seven countries, five of which are
non-nuclear: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya,
Russia and China. Such threat to use nuclear weapons
violates the negative security assurances that the US
gave to the non-nuclear weapons states that are parties
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the time of
that Treaty‚s Review and Extension Conference in
1995.
The report calls for strengthening the "U.S. Nuclear
Warhead Infrastructure." It states, "The need is clear
for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: ·be
able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and
certify new warheads in response to new national
requirements; and maintain readiness to resume
underground nuclear testing if required."
In sum, the Bush administration‚s Nuclear Posture
Review is a strategy for indefinite reliance on nuclear
weapons with plans to improve the capabilities of the
existing arsenal and to revitalize the infrastructure for
improving US nuclear forces in the future. The Nuclear
Posture Review promotes a nuclear strategy of maximum
flexibility as opposed to measures for irreversible
nuclear disarmament as agreed to at the 2000
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
As a candidate for president in 2000, Mr. Bush
announced that he wanted to reduce the level of strategic
nuclear weapons in the US arsenal to the lowest number
compatible with US security. Based on military studies,
that number was placed at between 1,700 and 2,200
deployed strategic nuclear weapons. According to the
Nuclear Posture Review, "Based on current projections, an
operationally deployed force of 1700-2200 strategic
nuclear warheads by 2012 will support U.S. deterrence
policy to hold at risk what opponents value, including
their instruments of political control and military
power, and to deny opponents their war aims."
The upper end of 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons is
nearly identical with the 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons
that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had agreed upon for
START III, when the method of counting is taken into
consideration. Under the counting system proposed in the
Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review, the weapons
aboard submarines being overhauled are not counted. Even
the lower end figure of 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons
was above the level of 1,500 (or less) that President
Putin had proposed.
As a candidate, Bush also promoted development and
deployment of a National Missile Defense to protect the
United States against nuclear attacks by so-called rogue
states, a proposal that would have been prohibited under
the ABM Treaty. Upon assuming the presidency, Bush dealt
with the impediment of the ABM Treaty by withdrawing from
it. He gave the six months' notice required by the Treaty
for withdrawal on December 13, 2001, and US withdrawal
became effective on June 13, 2002.
Prior to providing notice of withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty, both the Chinese and Russians attempted to
dissuade Mr. Bush from taking this step. Chinese
officials told the Bush administration that deployment of
a US missile defense system would necessitate an increase
in the Chinese nuclear arsenal capable of reaching the US
in order for China to maintain an effective although
minimal deterrent force. The response of the Bush
administration was that it had no problem with a build-up
of Chinese nuclear forces capable of threatening US
territory since the US missile defense system was aimed
at "rogue" nations and not at China.
Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty
In Spring 2002, Mr. Bush also reached agreement with
President Putin on a Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT). The two presidents signed this treaty in
Moscow on May 24, 2002. In the treaty, the two
governments agreed to reduce the actively deployed
strategic nuclear weapons on each side to Bush‚s
preferred numbers, as set forth in the US Nuclear Posture
Review, of between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012. The
treaty made no provisions for interim reductions, and
thus, despite SORT, it remains possible for either or
both sides to actually increase the size of their arsenal
between the inception of the treaty and 2012, so long as
the reductions to the agreed numbers occur by 2012. The
treaty is also set to terminate, unless extended, in
2012.
The treaty also made no provision for the nuclear
warheads that were removed from active deployment. The US
has announced that it intends to put many or most of
these warheads into storage in a reserve status, where
they will remain available to be reintroduced to active
deployment should this decision be taken in the future.
Presumably Russia will follow the US lead on this, thus
making many of its strategic nuclear weapons more prone
to theft by criminal organizations, including
terrorists.
The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty was announced
with considerable fanfare. It gave the public a sense of
progress toward nuclear disarmament, when in fact it was
far more of a public relations effort than an actual arms
reduction treaty. Although it did provide for removing
several thousand nuclear weapons on both sides from
active deployment, and in this sense it was a de-alerting
measure, it did not make these reductions irreversible as
agreed to by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
The Bush administration‚s nuclear policies have
not been favorable to nuclear disarmament. Many of its
policies have been contrary to the 13 Practical Steps for
Nuclear Disarmament set forth in the Final Document of
the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Not only has the Bush
administration withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, the
President has made it clear that he does not intend to
send the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty back to the Senate
for ratification. His administration has given
indications that it wishes to shorten the time needed to
resume underground nuclear testing, and is developing
more usable nuclear weapons and contingency plans for
their use.
In sum, the Bush administration is not taking
seriously, nor attempting to fulfill, US obligations for
nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. Nor has
it shown good faith in fulfilling the 2000 NPT Review
Conference's 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament,
including pursuing the promised "unequivocal undertaking
by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals." And without US
leadership to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons,
there is not likely to be significant progress.
The Role of the Anti-Nuclear
Movement
The effectiveness of the anti-nuclear movement in
reaching the US public and policy makers seems to have
diminished under the Bush administration. While the
promise of this movement seemed bright in the immediate
aftermath of the Cold War, this promise has not been
realized and at the moment is receding. In part, this is
because the ideologues in the Bush administration are not
receptive to proposals, no matter how reasonable, to
reduce nuclear arsenals or even nuclear risks. Another
factor in the diminished effectiveness of the US
anti-nuclear movement is that the issues of terrorism and
war have moved to the forefront and taken precedence over
nuclear weapons issues in the aftermath of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US.
In the aftermath of September 11th, public receptivity
to challenging Bush‚s nuclear policies became highly
restricted. The concern and fear generated by the
terrorist attacks created a greater willingness to use
force for protection of the US civilian population and
foreclosed possibilities for public consideration of any
reductions in armaments, nuclear or conventional, other
than those proposed from above, such as the SORT
agreement. The attacks also strengthened Bush's position
of leadership in the US, a fact that was reconfirmed in
the recent US elections.
One current challenge to the Bush administration's
defense policy is being mounted by 31 members of
Congress, led by Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio). Kucinich and
his fellow members of Congress are challenging in federal
court the president's authority under the Constitution to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty without
congressional approval. The lawsuit is based on the
theory that the Senate must ratify a treaty for it to
enter into force, and that once it does enter into force
the treaty becomes the "supreme Law of the Land"under
Article 6(2) of the Constitution. The congressional
challengers argue that once a treaty becomes law under
Article 6(2), it is not within the president's unilateral
authority to terminate that law and that the president
must seek congressional approval before acting to
terminate a treaty.
Many important proposals from non-governmental
organizations, including ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, agreement on a Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty, and de-alerting of the deployed
nuclear arsenal, were simply taken off the table as the
administration focused its efforts on rooting out
terrorists, the war in Afghanistan, and now the threat of
war against Iraq. But, while the anti-nuclear movement in
the US has receded, the peace movement has grown, and
this has been particularly so in relation to the
administration's threatened war against Iraq.
The reemergence of an active peace movement is a
hopeful sign. In recent weeks the numbers have grown to
tens of thousands of people, even hundreds of thousands
in large cities, taking to the streets. In California in
the small city of Santa Barbara where I live, there have
been hundreds of people taking to the streets each
Saturday to protest a war against Iraq. Should a war
against Iraq actually begin, the number of protestors
throughout the country will likely swell into the
millions.
The Logic of War Against
Iraq
The Bush administration has premised its case for war
against Iraq on the need for regime change, primarily
because Saddam Hussein may be trying to develop weapons
of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. It is
conceded that Hussein does not presently have nuclear
weapons, but may be able to develop one or more in the
future. The logic of the war from the perspective of the
Bush administration is that Hussein must be stopped from
obtaining a nuclear weapon, which he might use or pass on
to a terrorist organization. Thus, we have the irony of a
country with some 10,000 nuclear weapons seeking to go to
war to achieve nuclear disarmament of a country that has
yet to acquire a nuclear weapon. Surely this irony cannot
be entirely lost on the American people or the people of
the world, despite the official rhetoric of the Bush
administration justifying our possession of a huge
nuclear weapons arsenal.
This could be an educable moment for Americans. There
are many inconsistencies in US nuclear policies that
carry with them significant attendant dangers. Should
terrorists obtain nuclear weapons, they might kill
300,000 or three million inhabitants of a US city rather
than the 3,000 that were killed in the terrorist attacks
of September 1l, 2001. And yet, US policy is to spend
some seven to eight times more on developing missile
defense systems than on eliminating the threat of "loose
nukes"in the former Soviet Union. A bipartisan Department
of Energy Task Force on Russia, headed by former Senate
Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House
Counsel Lloyd Cutler, concluded that the US should be
spending some $3 billion annually for the next ten years
to keep Russia's nuclear arsenal out of danger of
terrorists. Instead, however, the US is spending only
some $1 billion annually on this, while spending $7.5
billion on missile defenses. If the US goes to war
against Iraq, that could cost some $200 billion and
require a continuing US military occupation of Iraq,
while increasing the threat of new incidents of
terrorism.
Global Dangers
Throughout the world nuclear dangers are increasing.
In South Asia, India and Pakistan continue to posture and
threaten each other with their relatively new nuclear
forces. These two countries continue their periodic
outbreaks of violence in their long-standing dispute over
Kashmir. In Northeast Asia, on the volatile Korean
peninsula, North Korea, according to the CIA, may have
developed a few nuclear weapons. North Korean
representatives have recently admitted to enriching
uranium, which may be used to develop nuclear weapons. In
the Middle East, the Israeli nuclear arsenal of some 200
nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems,
including submarines, continues to provoke attempts by
other countries in the region, including Iraq, Syria and
Saudi Arabia, to develop or acquire their own nuclear
arsenals. The security of the Russian nuclear arsenal
cannot be guaranteed, and the US is developing more
usable nuclear weapons and contingency plans to use them.
Should terrorists succeed in obtaining nuclear weapons,
anything could happen. These alarming circumstances
create an incendiary set of conditions that could explode
suddenly and without warning into nuclear holocaust.
The likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used in
the next five to ten years is greater today than at any
time since the end of World War II. Yet, at the present
moment, the world seems to be preoccupied with other
issues, while critical issues of nuclear control and
disarmament are removed from the public mind and agenda.
Rather than distracting the world from nuclear
disarmament, the increasingly grave threats of terrorism
should be providing additional impetus for fulfilling the
already well-established obligations to achieve complete
nuclear disarmament.
It should also give us pause to consider the
relationship of nuclear weapons to terrorism. In the end,
nuclear weapons may serve the poor and disenfranchised
better than they serve the rich and powerful. The rich
and powerful countries have far more to lose, and their
cities are extremely vulnerable to nuclear, radiological,
chemical or biological terrorism. In a more rational
world, such considerations would lead the most powerful
nuclear weapons states to act in their own interests by
leading the world toward nuclear disarmament. Alas, this
lesson has yet to be grasped by leaders in the United
States and other powerful nations. In the meantime, it is
these powerful nations that threaten the use of nuclear
weapons, and this must be seen by objective viewers to
constitute its own form of terrorism.
An active and effective nuclear disarmament movement
has never been more needed. Our best hope is that this
movement will reemerge with renewed energy and spirit
from the anti-war activities in the US and throughout the
world. It is extremely important now that the nuclear
implications of the current global crisis not be lost on
the anti-war movement, nor on the citizens of the
world‚s most powerful nations. The failure to make
these connections and to act upon them could result in
tragedies beyond our greatest fears.
David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).
Read about (and buy) Krieger's most recent book here
(amazon.com):
Choose
Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear
Age
Or here (amazon.co.uk) : Choose
Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear
Age
To become a free on-line participating member of the
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,
click here: https://www.ndic.com/wagingpeace/mbrshp.html.
©
TFF & the author 2002
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