BREAKING THE WAVES
Strategic Conflict Analysis of Burundi

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This report is part of a series of reports produced for the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). Other reports cover the conflict dynamics in Rwanda, and DRC. Separate reports were produced on the regional conflict configuration in the Great Lakes Region, and the Lake Victoria Region. The series of reports were produced jointly by the following team of researchers, Jonas Ewald (Team Leader, Göteborg University), Anders Nilsson (Växjö University), Anders Närman (Göteborg University), Patrik Stålgren (Göteborg University).
Acknowledging the collective contribution of the team, Patrik Stålgren is responsible for this report on Burundi. The report is based on fieldwork carried out in June 2003, as well as available reports and documentation. The bulk of the analysis was carried out in August 2003, why more recent developments are not fully integrated.
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1. History as pretext

History is a source of conflict in Burundi. Every historical account of the conflict has political connotations as the interpretation of history often serves to legitimise violence as “retaliation” or “pro-active”, while neighbours and family suddenly are draped in a lethal language of ethnicity. On a general level, two different historical narrations can be identified in the literature as well as in the interviews with concerned actors in today’s conflict. One vision sets the start of the current conflict at the 1993 elections and the assassination of Burundi’s first elected president Ndadaye. Most telling with this version is not its content, but its omissions. Among events left out are the decades of systematic marginalisation of the majority of the population (mainly Hutu, but also including many Tutsis), and the 1972 massacres of some 250,000 people (including much of the burgeoning Hutu elite). Not surprisingly then, these omissions are among the cornerstones of the second narration of the Burundi story. Again a general pattern can be detected in which Hutus embrace the second story while the incumbent Tutsi elite fosters the first.

With objectivity and impartiality out of sight, one way of starting an account of the Burundi conflict is with the death of King Ntare Rugamba around 1850. After the King’s death the power dynamic in Burundi shifted from a centralised kingdom to take a more feudal-like appearance with strong princes, the Ganwas, ruling different parts of the country. With the sons of Rugamba seeking to manifest their power base, Burundi expanded into a political entity twice the size of their father’s nuclear kingdom. The social stratification and division of powers within the princedoms are not decisively documented in historical sources. However, in contrast to Rwanda, it seems as if the level of homogenisation between ethnic and economic groups was quite high. The loyalty of the powerful Rwandan army gave the Rwandan chiefs a relative independence that was used to perpetuate and substantiate asymmetric relations. While not necessarily holding what would today pass as “legitimacy”, the feudal element in Burundi provided an element of institutional competition which called on the Ganwas to be relatively more sensitive to the demands of the masses. Historical accounts suggest that the monarchical system of the Ganwas was frequently the target of joint rebellions of Hutu and Tutsi groups. However, the very existence in Burundi of the Ganwa class, being neither Hutu nor Tutsi and thus able to function as an arbitrator in the distribution of goods and justice between these groups, can be seen as an explanatory factor for differences in the history of conflicts between Burundi and Rwanda.

On the eve of the colonial period, Burundi was fragmented into four rather distinct spheres of influence each with its own geographic area and under its respective Ganwa leadership. From the perspective of the current power struggle in Burundi
the most interesting feature in the precolonial distribution of power is the marginalised position of the Bururi area inhabited by the Tutsi group known as the Hima. A dominating theme in the postcolonial power struggle is how this group, though their control of the army, and hence the state, has turned its position as the “underdogs” of the precolonial system into a position from which it has controlled much of Burundi from independence until today.

Burundi was colonised first by Germany in 1899 and then ruled by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate, from 1916 to 1962, when Burundi gained its independence. Following a familiar pattern, the colonial powers introduced a package of burdens on the masses including compulsory labour, taxation, and obligatory crop cultivation. Illustrating the connection between demands from international markets, increased scarcity of natural resources and conflict in Burundi, the pressure derived from these demands made local people turn to the Ganwas for protection and aid. This strengthened the Ganwas at the expense of lineage powers in the country and hence the centralisation of power was increased. The centralisation of power in the Ganwas provided the colonial rulers with a small number of political actors by which they could manipulate the country using their familiar divide and rule strategy.

The high level of centralisation that characterises today’s Burundi was further entrenched by a series of administrative reforms. For example, from 1929 to 1945 the number of chefferies (chiefdoms) was cut down from 133 to 35. During the same reform the colonials further entrenched marginalisation of Hutus in Burundi. Out of the 133 chiefs in 1929, there were 27 known Hutus; in 1945 there were none. Using the number of chiefs as an indication of power, the Tutsis slightly increased their positions during the reform. The winners of the colonial administrative reform were two Ganwa groups known as Batare and Bezi. Before the rise to power of the current Tutsi/Hima rulers, we would see the demise of these two groups.

During the years prior to independence, the power struggle in Burundi indicated that colonialism would be replaced by a return to a sort of precolonial, monarchical system under the leadership of the Batare group and its leader prince Louis Rwagasore. In contrast to the precolonial period, the struggle was no longer about the control of certain chiefdoms but about capturing the state apparatus that was becoming the nexus of power, wealth, and security. What is more, the power struggle had taken on political colours and Rwagasore had founded the political party UPRONA that managed to transcend existing divisions in society and gained wide political support. (UPRONA won 58 of the 64 seats in the 1961 legislative elections which was part of the political reform process prior to independence). For various reasons the Belgians and the UN through their weight behind UPRONA’s main opponents, the Bezi’s party PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien). However, from a regional perspective, it is interesting to note that Rwagasore was widely associated with the agenda of Patrice Lubumba in what
was becoming Zaire. As a historical presidency of today’s strong connections to Tanzania, it is also interesting to note that discussions on far-reaching political integration was undertaken between Rwagasore and Julius Nyerere.

The assassination of Rwagasore in 1961 seriously undermined the viability of the monarchical system in Burundi. Given a symbolic position at independence, the system played a stabilising role during the first years of independence. But it could not contain nor channel the increasing discontent amongst the Hutu population. The discontent was instead manifested in the 1965 coup in which a group of Hutu military officers made an attempt to obtain the state powers. The coup was mainly directed at the monarchs, and was successful in that it eroded whatever power was left for the monarchs. Contrary to the expectations of the coup leaders, however, the coup did not lead to Hutu rule but was in fact used as a political pretext to accelerate the system of Tutsi domination. In the eyes of many Burundian Tutsis, the 1965 coup attempt was an early warning that the bloody events in Rwanda 1959 and the subsequent accession to power by the Hutus was now about to be repeated in Burundi. This association between Rwanda and Burundi formed a significant part of the legitimisation of the subsequent bid for power by Tutsi/Hima fractions in the army. Much like today, the events during the decisive years of the late 1950s and early 1960s illustrate that the Great Lake regions share a conflict psychology in which the collective construction of events and others constituted “legitimate” reasons to retaliate on what a more objective assessment probably would discount as the acts of a small extremist elite.

From the debacle of the first years of independence and the 1965 coup rose a new president, Michel Micombero. Interestingly, he can be characterised by reference to a set of characteristics that are representative of three Burundian presidents up to the 1993 elections: Michel Micombero (president from 1965-76), Jean Baptist Bagaza (1976-87), and Pierre Buyoya (1987-93) were all trained army officers of Hima descent, i.e. being a Tutsi group from Bururi province.

With the inauguration of Micombero, Burundi embarked on its post-colonial, self-reinforcing cycle of structural and direct violence. The cycle was fed by a complex of structural and political factors around the nexus of ethnic and geographic stratification and control with different social groups trying to obtain some degree of livelihood under increasing structural constraints. The dramatic events of 1965 were followed by new and violent uprisings in 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993. During the particularly savage violence in 1972, Micombero received support from Zaire’s Mubutu as the Hutu uprising at the time was construed as a common enemy: the Mulelists. In the 1972 events, an estimated 250,000 people were killed including most of the educated Hutus. Another 150,000 Burundians fled the country in terror, seeking refuge in neighbouring Tanzania where the vast majority remain to this day. The 1972 events unleashed a cycle of violence which has continued until the present time. During these cycles, periods of relative calm and security have been replaced by periods of killings and disorder.
Both the Second and Third Republics that followed Micombero’s First Republic were inaugurated by bloodless coups. Both Republics offered a new set of political rhetoric and, to some extent, institutional reform. The call for “National Unity” under Bagaza’s turn at the presidency turned out to be little more than a rhetorical disguise for continued marginalisation perpetuated in his educational reform, secularisation of society and state, and half-baked “villagisation” programme. The Structural Adjustment Programme introduced in 1986 contributed to feeding the rhetoric and hopes of reform but not the people. The political reforms undertaken by Buyoya increased the diversification of power, including the installation of a Hutu as Prime Minister. However, it was not until Buyoya was convinced by international and domestic actors to put democracy to the test that Burundi arrived at its biggest postcolonial window of opportunity. Following the adoption of a new constitution and introduction of a multiparty system, Melchior Ndadaye emerged as the winner of the June 1993 first democratic presidential election since independence. Buyoya’s eventual handover of power increased hope for long-term stability and broader political participation, and Burundi was hailed internationally as a symbol of peaceful democratic transition in Africa.

This fledgling hope was, however, abruptly shattered when President Ndadaye was assassinated on October 21st 1993, only four months after gaining power. The assassination unleashed yet again years of accumulated fear, resentment and rage. Massacres carried out in retribution for the killing of the president led to reprisals undertaken by the army to regain control of the countryside. Tens of thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands of others fled their homes and country, mainly into Tanzania and former Zaire. Those lucky enough to escape with their lives lost nearly everything else, including their homes, their land, their livestock and their future. The events of 1993 spurred a cycle of violence with a total toll until today of some 300,000 lives, 600,000 to 800,000 regional refugees, and 280,000 to 380,000 IDP.

After the assassination, Burundi was ruled by a succession of weak and divided administrations and unrest continued. In March 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights went as far as to refer to the ongoing civil war embroiling Burundi as a “genocide by attrition”. Just four months later, Major Buyoya returned to power through a bloodless putsch, which was widely condemned by neighbouring countries and the international community. Under the auspices of the UN, economic sanctions were imposed and remained until January 1999. Under the leadership of the former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, and after two-and-a-half years of negotiations in Arusha, nineteen Burundian political parties signed a peace agreement on August 28th 2000, in the presence of United States President, Bill Clinton, and many regional Heads of State. Signed under intense pressure from the facilitator, former South African President, Nelson Mandela, and from regional leaders, the agreement did not include a cease-fire
agreement (protocol III), although it did establish three protocols (I, II, IV), which establish a clear programme, including the creation of a transitional government, national assembly and senate, tasked with advancing the cause of reconciliation, democracy and reconstruction.

Summing up Burundi’s political history

Burundi’s political history can be depicted as a series of provocations and reactions where opposing groups take turn in identifying the others as the primus motor in an endless historical regression to justify the next wave of violence. The most significant features of this deplorable dynamic are:

1. The erosion of the precolonial monarchical system.
2. Colonial rules fails to create a functioning state but succeeded in entrenching imagined ethnic identities: In the context of a strategy of divide and rule the colonial powers introduced and supported economic structures and a culture of ethnic categories that in fact have shallow sociologic and historic foundations but provided a “tool kit” instrumental to putting up different components of Burundi's population against one another.
3. The centralisation of patronage resources in the state apparatus making the state the main instrument of group domination and an arena for competition between segments of the dominant group, but never anything that could be described as a legal-rational institution.
4. The centralisation of the state apparatus with all tax revenues being deported to Bujumbura and all public officials appointed from the capital.
5. The failure to install majority rule with security guarantees for the Tutsi elite who use the national army for its protection.
6. The systematic, violent and bloody system of minority rule by different constellations of elite networks centred around the Tutsi minority in general and the Hima from Bururi in particular, making geography the second most salient line of political mobilisation after ethnicity.

2. Themes in Burundi’s conflict configuration

The conflict configuration in Burundi is multidimensional and compounded by a number of different sources of conflict. We think that the amalgamation of four factors are the key to understanding the conflict complex. Each of these factors are elaborated in the section below. Moreover, they guide the forthcoming section **Approaching a cooperative strategy for Burundi**:

- Direct violence
- Structural violence
The conflict in Burundi is intricately interwoven into the regional conflict configuration of the Great Lake region. The sources of the conflicts have a multi-country character and the consequences of the conflicts affect several countries. Consequently, the problems cannot be managed if the development in the different states does not pull in the same direction. Processes in a neighbouring country could easily undermine a reform process or aid intervention, even if the intervention as such in a given context is internally coherent. This points at the need to support and coordinate interventions in several countries at same time — as well as analyse what side effects interventions in one country have on the neighbours. The problem described, is in turn an expression of sources of conflicts and dynamic processes. A number of the sources of conflicts are, however, also sources of development, if managed properly.

2.1. Direct violence in Burundi

Geographic variability
Burundi is characterised by variations in the level of direct violence in different parts of the countries. Only on a few occasions during the decades of conflict in Burundi has the conflict pattern been homogenous throughout the country. Each stage of the conflict has been simultaneously pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict which makes awaiting a national cease-fire in Burundi a futile exercise. At any particular time, different geographical areas will be hit by violence while others are relatively peaceful.

Actor flexibility
The conflict in Burundi has shown a high degree of variation in the set-up of actors engaged in direct violence. Low level of institutionalisation of actors, high costs of communication with geographically dispersed troops, and the accessibility of arms, has led to the repeated break-up of actors into sub-units taking on new names and new leadership.

In addition, the fractions show a surprisingly high level of flexibility in the patterns of alliances. The absence of clearly manifested goals facilitates a pragmatic approach in the constellation and change of actor alliances and networks and some groups seem to lack a coherent, long term goal or military strategy. As one commentator put it “Their goal is on their nose, so they can’t see
Instead fighting in itself has become a self-generating objective for groups typically consisting of a high proportion of child soldiers and young fighters brought up and traumatised by war.

Militarisation of societies throughout the region
The long drawn-out conflicts have brought about a general militarisation of all Burundi, both in terms of budget allocation, lifestyle and security situation. Interlinked to the militarisation of society is a staggering level of criminalisation of the every-day lives of millions of people which amount to a generally very high level of insecurity.

The proliferation of armed groups of different character and extent is a major challenge both for conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building. The term “rebel” group or “militia” refers to wide variety of groups, ranging from loose gangs of bandit, at times with a political objective, but not necessary so, to relatively well organised groups. As is further elaborated in the section below, the armed groups in Burundi are linked to a cobweb of networks, with local, national, regional and international dimensions, often with formal and informal connections and illegal activities on all levels.

In this context one could also point to elite rivalry on a regional level regarding hegemonic power. As will be evident from the section below, hegemonic efforts from elites Tanzania stand out via the support to FDD and the “Hutu-movement”. In addition, Burundi is also affected by elites in Uganda and Rwanda as well as in DRC who try to further its positions. The efforts are often channelled through proxies on other countries’ territories. This has contributed to the situation with multiplication of local warlords, often with weak social bases, but with protection from a government in another country. Patterns of alliances shift with a speed and flexibility that sometimes defies an outsider’s comprehension. In the process, spreading of rumours, disinformation, stereotyping and manipulation of identities all contribute to aggravating an already difficult situation.

Main actors in Burundi’s conflict configuration
FNL, the oldest of the Hutu-oriented rebel groups and currently under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa, is linked up to and gains support from Hutu oriented groups based in DRC, i.e. Interahamwe, Ex-Far, and Mayi-Mayi. The low level of institutionalisation of FNL and the DRC based groups calls into question any coordination between the groups. Nevertheless FNL are said to consist of 3-4000 men under arms. The support from DRC allegedly consists mainly of supplies of food and arms, and temporary shelter from the fighting in Burundi. There also seems to be a political/ideological link between FNL and Hutu-based groups in DRC that prompts the idea of an increased Hutu power in the region. Unconfirmed sources would claim that, together, these groups nurture a dream of a ”Hutu-land” located somewhere in the borderland of Rwanda,
Burundi and DRC. The actual viability of an alliance formed around a common dream, is questionable due to the low level of institutionalisation of these groups.

FDD under Peter Nkurunziza is the largest Hutu based group in Burundi with 10-20,000 men under arms. The main support base is in Tanzania. Evidently, the support comes from refugee camps in Tanzania and consists of supplies of military equipment, funds, food, and personnel. FDD, as well as FNL, obtain much of their material base though looting and informal taxation of the local population. FDD is said to have at least a core of very well organised fighters that are structured on the pattern of the Burundi National Army.

Several independent sources point to individual members of the Tanzanian government, most notably the Minister of Foreign Affairs, offering political and strategic support to FDD. The motive for this support is not clear but personal profit through the exploitation of patron-client relations is a likely candidate. It is not clear to what degree the Tanzanian adventure in Burundi has the blessing of President Mkaapa, but it is frequently argued that Tanzania has the ambition to strengthen its political and economic position in the region, and that it does not look kindly upon the increased role played in the peace process by South Africa. In this context it should be borne in mind that there is a long history of close political interaction between Burundi and Tanzania. During the early 1960s the issue of a political union between the countries was on the table in top-level discussions. Through much of the post-colonial period Tanzania has been known to side with the Hutu majority in Burundi. This has been seen as an expression of Tanzania’s socialist tradition and support of marginalised groups. In this tradition, support to FDD or similar Hutu groups could be seen as an extension of the liberation movement in Africa.

FDD troops use DRC for remobilisation. Although the reports are more scant than in the case of FNL, it seems evident that FDD receives support from other "Hutu" movements in DRC incl. Mayi-Mayi, Interahamwe, and Ex-Far.

The connection between Hutu-based groups in Burundi and DRC creates a direct link between DRC’s peace process and the relative power position of the alliances tied to the Burundi conflict configuration. The nature of this implication is, however, not clear. Peace in eastern DRC could imply the cutting off of support and hence the weakening of FNL and FDD. However, if a peace settlement in DRC is not inclusive, excluded groups, most likely various Hutu groups, could try to join up with FNL and/or FDD and found a lebensraum in Burundi.

Burundi and Rwandan Armed Forces, directly or via their proxies, have on several occasions joined forces in the fight against the common enemy of Hutu based groups in the boarder areas of Burundi, DRC and Rwanda.
AMIB (African Mission in Burundi) represents an international, military commitment in Burundi. The mission was agreed upon on February 3rd 2003 at the AU Heads of State and Government meeting in Addis Ababa. The mission comprising troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, with the mandate to monitor the transition to democracy and provide protection for politicians returning to the country from exile. Central to the mandate is assistance in the DDR process. Recent arrivals by Mozambican troops (Oct 19th 2003) have brought the mission to its full strength at 3,128 peacekeepers. Out of the AMIB troops, Ethiopia is contributing 1,297 soldiers, Mozambique 202 and the remainder are from South Africa. The mission represents the AU’s first military engagement, and is executed in close cooperation with the UN. Deployment of the peacekeepers has been beset by funding difficulties and logistics problems within the DDR process. The United States has financed the deployment of the Ethiopian contingent and Britain has paid for the Mozambicans. The Mozambican Ministry of Defence announced on October 15th that the government in Maputo would spend at least US $14 million to support its contingent over the next 12 months, with some of this money coming from donors such as Britain, France and the United States. In December 2003, South African Deputy President and facilitator of the Burundi peace process, Jacob Zuma, called on the UN and the international community to increase its commitment and financial support to the peace process.

Child soldiers
The horrendous situation for the future generation in Burundi is complicated by the culture of recruiting children to armed groups. These children become highly traumatised, often lack proper education and thus are a highly destabilising element in a post-conflict transformation process.

Arms trade
The almost unlimited access to weapons in the area is an important source and amplifier of conflicts. Control of the trade and distribution of arms is a prerequisite for stability in Burundi and the region. The difficulties in addressing the arms trade stems from the strong economic and political interests involved, and the fact that the trade is typically conducted in the nexus of (in)formal/(il)legal economy. Add to that the global increase in availability of arms and the regional interconnectedness of distribution. Small arms, as opposed to conventional weapons, are easy and inexpensive to manufacture and transport, and several factories in the region produce weapons. As a consequence, their production is highly decentralised which adds to the problem of control. In addition, the recycling of weapons from different conflicts in the region has increased access to weapons. FDD’s heritage of weapons from Zimbabwe’s DRC adventure stands out as a tragic example.
Security sector reform

The perhaps single most important issue in containment of direct and structural violence in Burundi and the Great Lakes region is a holistic and long-term commitment to a security sector reforms. On a technical level, the issue of security sector reform is much about how to integrate former rebels into national army and at the same time down size the army to make it reasonably large and diversified. The security sector reform was part of the negotiations in Arusha but sorts under Protocol III that was not signed. Nevertheless, the process of security sector reform is at the top of the political agenda.

However, the technical aspects of security sector reforms are at best the first step in a solution to the fundamental problem of security. In Burundi, control of the army has equalled not only control of the state, its resources and positions, but more importantly security against the perceived threat of extinction through genocide. Whereas many Tutsis today literally think that they will not live if they give up control of the army, many Hutus believe that they need to control the army or be killed by it. For the Hutus no sustainable solution to the security sector reform can be reached without a substantial reform of the army, but any attempt to reform of the army without including a solution to the Tutsi’s security situation is not likely to be successful. ²

Moreover, the network of formal and informal military alliances between governments and rebels in the region calls for a regional approach to “domestic” security problems. For example, the willingness of the incumbent Tutsi elite to reform the army hinges on a comprehensive solution including the FNL and FDD whose strategic agendas, and mobilisation patterns are highly regional.

2.2. Structural violence in Burundi

A structural violence is at the centre of conflicts in Burundi as in most of the societies in the Great Lake’s area. This includes extreme – and increasing – poverty, exclusion or marginalisation of the majority from economic, social, human and cultural rights, inequality in all respects, not the least of women, youths and children. This is a situation that creates widening frustration gaps both in the marginalised poor sections of the societies as among various elites.

Since its inauguration on Nov 1st 2001, and the successful turnover of power on May 1st 2003, the National Transitional Government has made some progress. However, the combined depredation of continued fighting and economic stagnation continues to sap morale and erode vital support for much of the

² In a deal aimed at providing the Tutsis with the necessary security guarantee, certain reform – including the reform of the army – requires the counter signature of vice President Alphonse Kadege to validate the signature of President Ndayizeye. This leaves UPRONA with the power to block decisions by the government, which was not given to Frodebu during the presidency of Buyoya.
population. Even in the case of a cease-fire leading to the end of direct violence in much of the country, the structural constraints for successful structural violence alleviation in Burundi are staggering. The economic growth during the SAP period (1986-92) was almost 4% per year, but this barely managed to topple the population growth. The SAP did not manage to set off structural reform in the agricultural or secondary sectors, and since 1993 the per capita GDP has halved while poverty incidence is reckoned to have doubled to 80% of the population. Commercial agriculture accounts for less than 5% of the GDP but still agricultural export, mainly coffee and tea, generate 90% of the official export earnings. This creates a high vulnerability to fluctuations in international markets. Burundi’s external debt is in the area of 200% of its annual GDP. Add to that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the generations of children traumatised by war and deprived of their right to education. Finally, and perhaps most worrying, given what we know about political mobilisation under increasing structural strains, population density in the country is 240 per sq Km, but with 90% of the population living in rural areas and dependent on subsistence farming, the more relevant figure is that the density is close to 770 inhabitants per sq Km in what is classified as arable land.

A high degree of structural violence in combination with incomplete nation building processes, lack of inclusive legitimate political processes, power sharing and institutions for the maintenance of a certain rule of law create a situation where structural violence turns to acute violence, both at macro- and micro-level. Structural violence hollows out cohesion in local communities, fuelling communal conflicts and within families resulting in domestic violence, splintered families and the collapse of social structures and values. Making the vulnerable even more vulnerable and frustrated, and potentially easier to mobilise by various elites.

Scarce resources and demographic stress
The rapid growth of populations and population density in Burundi as well as in different areas in the region (in particular in parts of Uganda, Rwanda, and East DRC) creates increased demands on land, water, firewood, economic resources and social services. FNL and FDD are known to recruit from social groups under stress, and if not managed properly, increased stress can become a breeding ground for widespread social frustration and mobilisation to ragtag armies.

Regional demographic fluidity
With the porosity of its national boarders in the Great Lakes region, conflicts create a high level of regional demographic fluidity. Burundi is the largest net contributor to the refugee in the Great Lakes Region. Adding to the magnitude of demographic fluidity are the vast numbers of IDPs in the country. Some of the people currently classified as refugees know no other home than the refugee or IDP camps, which calls into question these categorisations. A second methodological issue pertains to the elusive accuracy in the reports on refugees and IDPs. A report on the situation may present the odd combination of very accurate numbers of IDPs and refugees subdivided along different social strata,
while at the same time include caveats like “the IDP figures exclude a possible further 100 000 IDPs, and possibly more.” (UN OCHA July 31st 2002 pp 5-6). These “margins of error” reveal some of the problematics related to the demographic fluidity in the region. Camps are often located in areas with a very low level of infrastructure. This adds to the general problem of the control of their inhabitants and the high level of militarisation. IDPs and refugees are “hard currency” in the cynical market for attention and aid from the international donor community, which calls for the systematic inflation of the figures. Taking this into account table 1 provides an overview of the main population flows in the region.

Table 1: Population flows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Internally displaced</th>
<th>Percent of pop.</th>
<th>Refugees in other countries</th>
<th>Percent of pop.</th>
<th>Refugees from other countries</th>
<th>Percent of pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>633,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>371,533</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>48,958</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>252,382</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56,686</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>0,4</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>652,535</td>
<td>1,9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

These displaced populations often live in squalid conditions marked by a lack of personal security, fragile food security and an absence of basic health and education services. As will be elaborated on in the second on HIV/AIDS, displaced populations tend to be at a greater risk of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

The displaced populations typically constitute a security risk both for the revising communities and the country of origin. The influx of large groups of people increases the strain on the local communities and their ability to provide for their own food security. Increases in demand for food, land, water, sanitation provides structural conditions conducive to political mobilisation against the displaced populations. Systematic and collective stigmatisation of the displaced groups, for example as *genocidaires* hiding for justice, further hampers the integration into the revising communities.

The presence of large uprooted populations outside their country of origin provides opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks, to profit from humanitarian aid, and to recruit new members, if necessary by force. FDD use refugee camps in Tanzania, and to some extent in DRC, as safe havens to launch attacks into Burundi and as recruitment centres for new members. Burundi refugees in DRC are also known to have mingled with Ex-FAR and Interhamwe and their conflict with Rwanda.

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3 Most country data are reported for the second half of 2001. In some countries, the numbers are only a rough estimate of the possible range of persons internally displaced. The Global IDP Database has, in most of these instances, calculated a median figure using the highest and lowest available estimates.
Tanzania is by far the largest receiver of Burundi refugees, which has generated both incomes and conflicts over scarce resources and insecurity for the population in the areas where camps are located. In addition, the future of the refugee camps constitutes a concrete reason for Tanzania’s involvement in the Burundi conflict.

Demobilisation, repatriation and – above all – the reintegration of refugees and IDPs is a key question, both for reducing human suffering and stabilising the security situation. At the same time this is a politically sensitive process. Among the issues that need to be addressed are: How shall returning refugees be integrated, in particular if there is a shortage of land? Have the possessions of the refugees been appropriated by another returning refugee or a former neighbour? How shall repatriation and reintegration be carried out without tilting a precarious political balance? How shall crimes and violence committed by various groups be reconciled? The National Commission on Refugees and IDPs (CNRS) is the institutional arrangement set out in the Arusha Agreement with the mandate to lead the reintegration of refugees and IDPs in Burundi. According to the Arusha Agreement, CNRS was to have an independent status in relation to the government. This independence has been called into question by a recent law passed in Parliament placing it under the supervision of the Ministry of Reconstruction.

Infrastructure
Insufficient, deficient or destroyed infrastructure is a source of conflict; it creates a foundation for isolated rebel groups as it undermines the development of formal economies and integration in national and international economy as well as societies. Denying remote areas access to markets, social service, information etc., provide a hotbed for rebel groups to mobilise frustrated marginalised populations. Economic and social development in urban/central areas but not in the periphery create uneven development and increasing frustration gaps in the periphery, as clearly illustrated by current tensions between Bujumbura and the rest of Burundi. In addition, it is costly and difficult to control areas with incomplete infrastructure.

HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS is reported as the most frequently cause of death in Burundi. In 2001, 40 000 people died from Aids, and with an average infection rate of 8.3 percent, the prognosis is bleak. Add to that the quarter of a million Aids-related orphans in Burundi and the horrors of the pandemic defy description.

Many Burundians are known to subscribe to sexual habits conducive to the spread of the virus. In addition, the conflict in Burundi and the region increase the speed by which the virus spreads. Among the processes by which the HIV/AIDS problematics is accentuated by the regional conflict dynamic are (i) social and demographic disruption increasing the general level of vulnerability and risk, and
placing highly marginalised people, in particular women and children, in a position where security can only be obtained in exchange for sexual services; (ii) the use of rape as a weapon to inflict long term psychological traumas; (iii) men under arms trade their social military prestigious positions for high levels of sexual interactions and partners.

Among the projects set out to counter the pandemic are the World Bank programme Great Lakes Initiative on Aids, and the Society for women against Aids in Africa, stand out in their support for women. A recent review commission by USAID and UNICEF, “HIV/AIDS and Conflict: Research in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern-DRC, argues that the major problem with the current approach of the international donor community is not the level of engagement but rather that their work is “slow and uncoordinated”. The countries in the region are reported to have launched multisectorial national Aids strategies backed by international, national, and an impressive number of local initiatives and actors. The call is however made for an increase in the evaluation of efforts, coordination in programmes and funding, and transparency in the distribution of funds.

2.3. The construction of knowledge and identities

The third, and to our minds, a very significant source of conflict is the cognitive process where the histories, identities and interpretations of today’s situation is constructed. A key process is the systematic manipulation by elite’s of uneducated and marginalised masses, setting off self-sustaining processes of the construction of identities built on fear and stereotypes of the other.

Perhaps the most complex knowledge construction in Burundi is “ethnicity” which of course is also a major source of mobilisation and violence. The challenge is to understand the complexity, and ambiguous fluidity of identity as a social (re-)construction.

A prime conflict generator in the region is the interpretations of historical atrocities by constructed collectives, legitimising retaliation on individuals at best loosely connected to the actual event. Constructing history so that blame can be attributed to a certain group constitutes a ”legitimate” cause for retribution. Reports about ”reality” are never neutral. Whether or not it is the intention of the reporter to report on conflicts containing a message of who is to blame and what the ”legitimate” response is. For example, a recurrent pattern in conflict reports is that the Hutu militia, which called on the response of the government’s armed forces, started them. Such reports rationalise the intervention of the government by stating, ”They started it”. No mention is made of circumstances that would place the actions of the so called Hutu militia in an historical context (Where were these ”militia” men from? What is their rationalisation for their action? What historical atrocities have they been subjected to?). The role of history as a conflict
generator calls for information pluralism and processes of critical evaluation and contextualisation of "facts".

**Regional conflict psychology**

The historical and cultural proximity between Burundi and the regional conflict configuration creates what we would call a “regional conflict psychology”. This regional conflict psychology is fed by, and feeds, conflicts through the region. Events anywhere in the region are interpreted in light of this psychology and add to the narrations in which different groups are stigmatised or portrayed as martyrs. The region’s cycle of violence has also served to legitimate violence through the establishment of a culture of impunity for politically sanctioned violence. To give an example, the current level of ethnic violence in Burundi cannot be understood without factoring in the 1972 events in Burundi which in turn must be seen in light of the psychological factors stemming from Rwanda in 1959. A more recent example is the interpretation of recent events in Ituri as a conflict between Hutu (Lendu) and Tutsi (Hima) which adds to the pattern of ethnic strife in Burundi and Rwanda. Similarly, FNL’s recent shelling of Bujumbura stands as a reminder to the inhabitants of Kigali of what damage can be inflicted by a small group of "violent Hutus".

**Competing” reversed mirror” models for legitimate management of societies**

The state-based elites in Bujumbura and Kigali have chosen contradictory strategies to address the dilemma of ethnicity in their two countries. The relative success of either regime has implications for the legitimacy of the other’s strategy. This constitutes the basis for mutual interests between the two state-elites. If the Burundian strategy, with an explicit and very outspoken approach to ethnical differences and a system of ethnic quotations, proves relatively more successful, the Rwandan strategy, characterised by a “de-ethnification” of the society, will be called into question. The reverse is also true.

**Reconciliation, rehabilitation and trauma**

The history of violence in Burundi has created generations of traumatised people; this presents one of the absolute biggest challenges in the reconciliation and rehabilitation of those deeply psychologically affected by the violence and social stress. The enormous numbers of severely traumatised people, not least women and children, is a source of immense suffering, but also a time bomb if not properly managed, which the situation in former Yugoslavia so clearly demonstrates. Unfortunately, the available capacity and expertise is far too low.

**2.4. Deficient democracy, governance, and rule of law**

Burundi faces a situation of lack of democracy, good governance and a legitimate political order based on a “social contract” between the ruler and the ruled providing a foundation for citizenship. The structures, institutions, regulatory frameworks and the culture of democracy and good governance are weak. A
number of more or less elaborated democratic institutions existed in the traditional society, but most of these have been destroyed or hollowed out during the postcolonial period. Consequently there is a lack of arenas for voicing political dissent and a lack of culture, and national and local power sharing.

The logic of state power in Burundi
The state in Burundi functions in agreement with the familiar pattern of patrons seeking to gain personal interests through exclusive relations with selective clients rather than seeking the good of the nation. The state-based patron – client relations comprise all spheres of life leaving little room for an independent private sector or civil society. As this pattern of exchange is epiphenomenal to a complex and historically entrenched system of political, economic and social life, any expectations for quick changes face very high odds. The extent to which reform is currently taking place in Burundi will mostly be in terms of changing the player, not the name of the game.

The institutional capacity within the government is exceptionally low following the long conflict period, and the economic free fall, experienced in the aftermath of falling coffee prices, the regional embargo, and the massive cutbacks in international aid. The fieldwork in Bujumbura confirmed the assessment by ICG that "The government lacks the information and analysis necessary for accurate planning, along with the staff capacity to actually monitor programmes or assess situations on the ground. In addition, once information is available and plans are developed, there is uncertainty as to who can effectively implement the programmes.”

No quantitative figures exist on the level of corruption in Burundi. But different assessments seems to compete in finding the most derogatory, and hence most fitting, wording to describe this pandemic. In addition, the administrative structure is characterised by a high level of centralisation. All administrators are appointed by the central government. Taxes collected from the commune level are centralised in Bujumbura, and there are basically no institutionalised mechanisms for public accountability.

This calls for a close partnership with the Burundian government as well as any other collaborating partner in Burundi. Capacity building has been undertaken by some bilateral donors, the UN and the IFIs, most notably within the fiscal, education, and health sectors. Nevertheless, the needs remain staggering.

Democratisation
The lack of a legitimate social contract and efficient political institutions makes the current process of democratisation a veritable powder keg. According to democracy theory, democracy is the most efficient way to manage societal conflicts, both within and between countries. It provides framework for negations.

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4 A Framework For Responsible Aid To Burundi ICG Africa Report No 57. p. 13-14
and brokering between different interest, solving disputes by peaceful means. However, it might be that this form of democracy theory is based on specific western experience. Having being hailed as a democratic success story, the 1993 experiences from Burundi of rapid introduction of a “multiparty system” now stands out as a deterring example of the risks of failed democratisation processes. The lesson learnt is that it is more important to focus on the content than on the form. Elections too early in a democratisation process might generate conflicts, in particular in a context with ethnicity as a dominating line of social stratification. Without proper institutions and establishment of a political culture, an early election might lead to continued polarisation of ethnicity, openly or candidly, or territorial belonging and xenophobia.

The democratisation process in Burundi is in a dilemma. In short, the dilemma is this: Elections in November 2004 are likely to offset a new wave of violence, while postponing them will undermine the legitimacy of the process out of the current conflict.

The Arusha Agreement stipulates that democratic elections be held in November 2004. However, a very frequent assessment in Bujumbura is that this goal will be very difficult to achieve. Not withstanding practical constraints, such as the lack of a cease-fire, lack of an election law, the need to update the electoral register, the need for infrastructure arrangements to conduct elections, the main objection towards the elections is the eminent risk that the election campaign will be turned into a rally on ethnic grounds which would most likely ignite a new wave of violence throughout the country. However, considering the weight given to the elections in the Arusha Agreement, any attempt to postpone the election date risks setting off the current momentum for the Arusha process. Such attempts would most certainly be used by FNL (and possibly FDD) to boost its raison d’etre. In the eyes of the international donor community, postponing the elections could be seen as a severe break with the Arusha process that certainly would not increase the likelihood of the reimbursements to Burundi.

Inter- and intra-elite rivalry for resources via the regional conflict

The structural violence is fuelled by inter- and intra-elite struggle of the resources. The foci of the struggles take different shapes depending on the type of resources that are available. In Burundi, with little available natural resources, the control over the state is in focus while in eastern DRC the struggle is more directly linked to control over various resources outside the state apparatus. This means that, in DRC, different actors could gain from keeping the state weak in DRC to be able to maintain their relative position. However, through the high degree of regional interconnection, it also means that elites in DRC may have an interest in keeping the struggles running in Burundi in order to bring out resources from DRC more easily.
Inter- and intra-elite rivalry for resources in Burundi

Given the Arusha signatures the following question can be asked about Burundi: Does the co-habitation of UPRONA and FRODEBU in the current government imply a tendency towards a fusion between the parties’ elites? The likelihood of such a scenario would be increased by the fact that urbanised elites in Bujumbura – representing both Hutu and Tutsi – are increasingly subjected to a common enemy in the rural based guerrilla movements occupying the areas around the city. If this would be the case it could be seen as a sign of a new elite formation based on an urban class interests cutting across ethnic lines.

However intriguing, this scenarios did not find any support during the fieldwork in Bujumbura. On the contrary, ethnicity was the absolutely dominating filter through which actors interpreted the conflict.

Nevertheless, the conflict in Burundi should not be seen as a struggle between Hutu and Tutsi. The above section History as a pretext stressed the different between Tutsi groups, and even now there is nothing like a joint Tutsi front in Burundi. Among the groups frequently mentioned are AC-Genocide, PA-Amasekania, Accord Cadre, former President Bagaza joins some “extreme” Tutsis under PARENA (Partie pour le Redressement National), and his successor Pierre Buyoya is frequently cited as the leader of some ready-to-talk-Tutsis in UPRONA. Another increasing power struggle is that between different Hutu-based actors. With Mugabarabona, Ndayikengurukiye, and Karumba part of the Transition Government the main self-proclaimed representatives of the Hutus are Rwasa (FNL) and Nkurunziza (FDD). While Rwasa’s FNL might be the most vocal actor claiming to represent the “true” Hutu cause, FDD is the more serious candidate for increased power. In this context it should be borne in mind that FDD has a history of close relations with FRODUBU and increased cooperation is likely. It is however not evident that FDD will remain as an actor under the current leadership of Nkurunziza. Signs of a split within FDD have already been visible, and if FDD moves closer to FRODEBU it might very well have to pay, by once again being divided.

The most prominent Hutu leader in Burundi is perhaps not President Ndayizeye but the Speaker of the House, Minani. With the Arusha Agreement disqualifying Ndayizeye as a candidate in the upcoming elections Minani is FRODEBU’s likely candidate. What is more, Minani is known to have exceptionally good connection with Tanzania and FDD. Some observers even argue that some of the FDD troops are under Minani’s command. In the history of alliances and acronyms in Burundi, this “unholy” alliance might constitute the foundation for a new Hutu platform in Burundi (maybe known as “Frodebu-FDD”?)

Legal justice and the culture of impunity

It is commonly assessed that the prisoners in Burundi are too few and that the 10,000 imprisoned to a large extent are the “wrong” people. They are the “small”
criminals in comparison with the big criminals still enjoying freedom and
affluence as part of Burundi’s elite. The capacity and will of the justice system to
enforce law and order is highly questionable and for decades, impunity has
become part of the lifestyle endorsed by Burundi’s elite.

Nevertheless, impunity receives centre stage in the current conflict, and the
incumbent elites engage in trying to set the agenda for Burundi, based on how to
handle the past rather than build a future. Lack of security mechanisms for these
actors and their current control of armed forces has put Burundi in a dilemma:
While many argue that no peace can be built without addressing historical
atrocities, actors who stand the risk of being brought to justice have the capacity
of perpetuating the fighting.

Human Rights
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch concur in their reports on the
systematic violation of human rights in Burundi. The atrocities have been carried
out by the national army and the rebel movements alike and include torture,
violence against non-combatant parties, and sexual violence. FNL as well as FDD,
edespite having signed the Arusha Agreement, use of child soldiers, and more or
less explicit kidnapping to recruit troops. Despite the Burundi’s commitment to
human rights agreements, the Burundi national army is frequently reported to
have killed civilians and government forces have barred access by humanitarian
agencies to displaced persons leaving them without adequate food, water and
medical assistance.

In a report covering January to May 2003, the Burundian human rights group,
Iteka, says that despite the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the
government and FDD/Nkurunziza, the human rights situation has not improved in
the country. Murder, torture, sexual assault and other violations continued during
the period covered by the report. Iteka also points to the systematic exploitation of
civilians by belligerents, including the transport of ammunition and looted goods.

Iteka further points to the role of the government to cater for recently repatriated
people. As an indication of the need for action, Iteka reports that of the 57 000
people repatriated during the reporting period, 46 percent had no access to
housing, 22 percent had no land, and 34 percent had no access to medical care.

The history of human rights violations in Burundi evokes the question of
impunity. The question of impunity applies to the national army and the rebel
forces alike. Neither of the rebel forces has announced any form of accountability
for combatants guilty of violating international humanitarian law. Even though the
government forces stand under national laws, the de facto implementation of
international commitments to human rights is deplorable.
Nevertheless, some progress can be seen in the recent passing of a law by the Assembly and the Senate against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Human Rights Watch argues that the law "marks a major step" in Burundi, but point to the tremendous problems with implementation. The new law includes a call for an international judicial commission of inquiry under the UN to investigate crimes in the whole post-colonial period, i.e. a period of more than forty years. It also asks for an international criminal tribunal to be created. Without further details on the division of labour, the assembly further proposed the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to cover the same period.

Civil society is reported to have played a critical role in these recent changes, and managed to force the government to back down from its claim to have a seven-year respite on certain clauses in the new law that would have restricted the sphere of investigations.

Civil society
Burundi is enriched by a vibrant web of formal and informal organisations for material exchange and social and political interaction. There is need for additional documentation of the dynamics of Burundi’s civil society. Informants testify to an increasing bifurcation between a rural and urban civil society. Whereas the rural civil society is typically informally organised and concerned with issues of physical security, food production, and civic training, associative life in Bujumbura reflects the interests of the elites. Coordination between the rural and urban civil society remains weak, and the close connection between the ruling elite and the urban civil is reflected in the low level of critical engagement with the government. This limits the degree to which support to (urban) civil society will contribute to the development of the country.

In relation to human rights, the less active role taken by civic organisations should also be seen against reports on intimidation by the government. Without the ambition to provide a comprehensive list of civil organisations that stand up for civic rights, the human rights group Iteka deserves to be mentioned for its continued outspokenness. In addition, Search for Common Ground champions universal rights through activities within a number of sectors, including media and women groups. In addition, representatives of Pentecostal as well as Catholic churches are known for their broad engagements and have frequently voiced criticism against the abuse of force and the need for democratic and human rights reforms.

Media
The government record in relation to the media includes repeated violations of national and international proclamations on the freedom of expression. As an example of the harassment, it can be mentioned that the web-based information service, Net Press, was shut down for two months in 2002 on accusations of
undermining national unity. The policy is known to have beaten a journalist from Studio Ijambo in March 2002 after he had covered a meeting of a radical Tutsi group. Harassment has also followed reports from military attacks on civilians. In March 2003 President Buyoya summoned journalist to inform them that they must not allow rebels to speak on the radio. Adding to the bleak picture are reports of recent setbacks in the efforts to establish a stronger guarantee for the freedom of expression as a proposed press law was tabled by the Assembly and sent back to the Council of Ministers.

Nevertheless, comparing their situation with colleagues in Rwanda, journalists in Burundi underline that the restrictions they face still leave quite some room for critical and nuance reporting. It is also commonly held that for some years, Burundi has experienced a positive trend for freedom of expression. Today there are a number of private newspapers published, and even though the government monopolises national TV, there are about 6-9 private radio channels with a wide outreach. Association Burundi de Journalist (ABJ) has 300 registered members, and the Maisson de la Press also gathers a fair number of journalists in Bujumbura.

3. Scenarios

The development in Burundi is most likely to be a slow and incremental process with several repeated drawbacks and high humanitarian and financial costs. But there are still plenty of signs of a positive direction and despite the plethora of actors with questionable agendas, the will for progress among actors at all levels, local, national, regional and international, dominates the picture.

The matrix below outlines three different scenarios around some key areas in the Burundi conflict. The interrelation between the different areas does not imply an even development on all fronts. On the contrary, Burundi is likely to be characterised by uneven development where different areas progress at different rates. It is also likely that substantial geographic differences will be sustained in Burundi so that some regions experience real progress while others continue to decay. As will be further elaborated in the section on policy recommendations, this calls for a high degree of knowledge and flexibility on behalf of Sida.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best case scenario</th>
<th>Most likely scenario</th>
<th>Worst case scenario</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct violence</td>
<td>Direct violence</td>
<td>Direct violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A cease-fire agreement with nationwide implementation built on a regional solution.</td>
<td>A two-step solution in which FDD and the government must first reach an agreement with the blessing and outright support of regional leaders. The support may either consist of direct support to the cease-fire or of being cut off</td>
<td>No regional solution to the direct violence why every effort in Burundi is undermined. FNL and FDD, in its current forms or as fractions or in new alliances, will continue fighting supported by their regional networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No new warring fractions are developing.</td>
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from support to the regional network in support of the warring party in Burundi. In the second step, FNL are being outmanoeuvred or simply beaten in combat.

On the eve of every step towards a solution, some new actors will try to manifest themselves as vital negotiating partners, but these actors must quickly be contained or beaten.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural violence</th>
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<th>Structural violence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Reintegration of former combatants:</td>
<td>Reintegration of former combatants:</td>
<td>Reintegration of former combatants:</td>
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<tr>
<td>The great number of armed men, children and women, in particular FDD and FNL, are disarmed and reintegrated in society and/or the national army.</td>
<td>Former combatants are slowly reintegrated in a process struggling with frequent setbacks and high financial costs. But the wide spread war fatigue, the low level of local legitimacy for the fighters, and the ongoing DDR programmes manage to keep up a slow momentum in the process.</td>
<td>No momentum for reintegration is reached. The equation for individuals under arms does not tilt in favour of handing over the weapons and trusting the “system” to give them alternative means of survival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The reintegration process does not only have a national, but a truly regional outreach.</td>
<td>Security sector reform:</td>
<td>Security sector reform:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security mechanisms are developed that ensures the current elite secured by the army. The mechanisms include regional actors.</td>
<td>Fear of systematic marginalisation, violence, and even genocide of the Tutsis is not overcome by any institutional mechanisms.</td>
<td>The Burundi army is divided into several fractions of which some conflate with the ethnic lines. Alliances are made between the fractions of the Burundi army and different rebel groups and their regional networks (in their current or new forms).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Burundian army is modernised to function in the service of all Burundians. It functions in accordance with human rights principles and is institutionalised under civilian rule.</td>
<td>The control of the army remains with the current elite for a substantial length of time.</td>
<td>In contrast to a situation of institutional security guarantees, the search for security is turned into an arms race in which political elites seek military power to ensure their own and their client’s security demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arusha Protocol III is most likely the foundation for further discussions of the reform.</td>
<td>Any attempts to speed up the security sector reform will be checked by the incumbent elite.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Peace dividends:**
A substantial peace process, including a cease-fire, is manifested in direct material form for wide groups of society, including the realisation of some of Burundi’s true development potentials in trade, industry, and tourism.

The release of international aid and support plays a decisive role.

Natural resources and economics:
Following a decisive peace, the structural constrains of decreasing natural resources, low productivity levels, and microscopic secondary sector are addressed. Mechanisms for integration in regional and global markets are constructed.

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**Peace dividends:**
An uneven peace process, together with the fresh memory of war, decreases the level of violence. As people are allowed to return to their homes and take up farming, this will constitute a decisive sentiment of dividends that feeds into the peace process.

Natural resources and economics:
The structural constrains are perhaps the biggest threat to peace after the cognitive constructs of instrumented ethnic categories and historical events. A slow progression in the sustainable use of agricultural methods, including some secondary industries, is achieved. Regional trading mechanisms, including EAC and Comesa, are further developed.

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**Cognitive reintegration**
National reconciliations:
A formal, and informal, process of national reconciliation is set in motion on national and local level, but also including regional actors. It includes actors from all spheres of society, in particular current and potential leaders and intelligentsia.

History as a pretext:
The short-term goal of this process is to de-instrumentalise history and ethnicity to avoid these tools once again being used to inflict direct violence. A vital step towards this goal is to address the issue of impunity. The long-term goal is to constitute a common platform for the formulation of a vision for national and regional development.

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**Cognitive reintegration**
National reconciliations:
A slow and incremental process of national integration is set of including the political and academic elite. Few signs of progress emerge before the issue of impunity is addressed. Some actors from the region are invited but many local level actors in Burundi and representatives from refugee camps and dispersed guerrilla movements, are left out.

History as a pretext:
The process of reconciliation becomes a battlefield for the strategic construction of histories and identities to which issues of impunity and future power positions are linked. Frequent drawbacks are experienced but progress is made with constructive support from international and regional actors.

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**Cognitive reintegration**
National reconciliations:
Efforts towards national reconciliation attract some donor funds but are not translated into anything but rhetoric and unread reports.

History as pretext:
Continued instrumentalisation of cognitive constructs conducive for direct and structural violence.
Ethnic tensions: Means are found to achieve “cognitive reintegration” whereby ethnic stereotyping is deinstrumentalised in relation to violence and short-term political goals. Vital means are a pluralistic and critical knowledge-society with a well-trained press, intelligentsia, and educated population. Ethnic tensions: Ethnic tensions are not eroded but checked though institutional mechanisms for power sharing and security guarantees for minorities. Ethnic tensions fade out in a society where substantial socio-economic groups experiencing the benefits of coexistence and mutually benefiting cooperation.

Ethnic tensions: Ethnic tensions are perpetuated through mechanisms of stigmatisation and fear of why they continue to feed direct violence and hinder the development of a common vision and trust conducive to collective action.

Democratic governance and rule by law

The November 2004 elections are successfully accomplished and the democratisation process is gaining momentum. This scenario must however be seen as quite unrealistic. More realistic, but still in the realm of a “Best case” is that a wide consensus is reached for how to postpone the elections and set the course for a long-term democratisation process.

Democratic governance and rule by law

The November 2004 elections are executed in accordance with the Arusha process and as a final attempt to mitigate the release of donor funds. The election campaign is turned into a rally around ethnicity, impunity, and revenge. The current slow process of progress is substantially set back.

Democratic governance and rule by law

The campaign for the November 2004 elections is the end of the democratisation process in Burundi and start of increased fractionalisation and violence.

4. Approaching a cooperative strategy for Burundi

Some positions in the international debate on poverty and conflict have lately begun to downplay the role of poverty in our contemporary global pattern of armed conflicts. In one particular sense, this is a playing with words, though it is statistically evident that not all armed conflicts are taking place in the poorest of the poor countries. However, it has never been possible to establish any significant causality between poverty and armed conflict. That is why this discussion today is aiming beside the target. The argument against the poverty approach has few, if any, receiver. Hence, a pure poverty alleviation approach to conflict adapted development cooperation is no longer an issue.

We have chosen to use Galtung’s distinction between direct and structural violence as a way of describing that the peace process must contain, simultaneously, measures against both its violent expressions - direct violence and structural violence. The violence preoccupying us today is mostly visible in its expressions of direct violence. But from our point of view, the direct violence is an effect of an increasing, deepening structural violence, which have been persisting for a very long time in Burundi and the Great Lakes Region. This structural violence is not receiving the attention it deserves, and we are trying to deal with an integrated part of the war. Nevertheless, looking at the war as a continuum in which expressions of direct and structural violence are simultaneously present, and overlapping, the structural violence deserves much more attention within the international development cooperation institutions,
because these are the institutions controlling the instruments to be used against structural violence.

Hence, we intend to widen the concept of poverty, and enrich the ‘aid’ vocabulary with the expression ‘structural violence alleviation’, as a way of advancing the humanistic imperative of poverty alleviation into ‘aid’ activities working in, and on, conflicts. For those opting for work around conflicts, this reasoning will be less relevant.

As we see both elite groups and broader layers of the population as active and dynamic participants in armed conflicts, any efforts for long-term conflict resolution do have to direct attention to both these components. The expressions we have used from time to time, politicisation and instrumentalisation, reflect our understanding, that there is a meeting point between the politicisation of identity as a bottom-up process, leading to vulnerability for the top-down elite-based instrumentalisation of politics, and mobilisation for violence. Logically, one dimension of working in, or on, a conflict is to adapt activities to ‘do no harm’ (working in the conflict) or finding approaches and activities, which may contribute to reversing the politicisation and instrumentalisation processes. Mirroring the conflict escalating processes, it would be adequate to talk about depoliticisation and deinstrumentalisation as the counter measures.

All this discussion may seem superfluous for our main task to operationalise a conflict analysis into concrete actions. But we have increasingly been convinced that international development cooperation in a conflict setting must increase its understanding of the necessity to establish very close linkages between the conflict analysis and the concrete measures to be implemented.

We have chosen, very much tentatively, to talk about ‘cognitive reintegration’ and ‘structural violence alleviation’ as collective expressions for these counter measures. With cognitive reintegration (or change) we understand changes in the mental structure, which is the ‘broker’ between the perception of conflict issues, on the one hand, and both attitude and behaviour, on the other, if we borrow the vocabulary of the conflict triangle. Structural violence alleviation is, as hinted above, an expansion of poverty alleviation into the realm of conscious conflict management and resolution.

Both these kinds of activities are present in both depoliticisation and deinstrumentalisation, though to a different degree. We assume that in a situation where direct violence is ongoing, or recently terminated, elites are relatively more in need of cognitive changes than structural violence alleviation, while the opposite would be the situation for broader layers of the population, as well as rank and file combatants. The rank and file also need, obviously, in the long run, a change in the conflict perception, though material changes in survival opportunities may be more important in periods of disarmament and
demobilisation. Vice versa, discontented and marginalised elite groups would, normally, not suffer from livelihood shortages of material kinds in the short run, but be more perceptive for new visions and realistic assessments of their role and position in the medium and long run.

4.1. Strategic considerations for working in and on the Burundi conflict

The existing conflict, as well as, an increase in the level of conflict in Burundi is not an insurmountable obstacle to expand on engagements in Burundi. The conflict configuration should determine how, not how much, to engage in Burundi. Working in and on the conflict in Burundi thus calls for strategic considerations in terms of Sida’s engagement in Burundi. Among the strategic considerations to consider are:

- The geographic variations in the level of conflict in Burundi calls into question any decision based on an analysis of Burundi as being either pre-conflict, conflict, or post-conflict. Burundi’s history is marked by all three phases being present at the same time, but in different regions of the country. Awaiting a cease-fire in Burundi is thus a futile exercise. At any particular time, different geographical areas will be hit by violence while others are relatively peaceful. Even if the developments on some issues and in some geographic regions progress towards a Best Case Scenario, developments in others may well be in the realm of the Worst Case Scenario. This calls for a high degree of professionalism and local knowledge on behalf of Sida.

- The variability and complexity of the conflict in Burundi calls for clear exit strategies.

- The need for geographic and sector area flexibility should discourage Sida from high input programmes until a more stable progress can be assured.

- The need for humanitarian aid to Burundi is likely to be eminent for a substantial future. All efforts should be future looking and provide for a long-term sustainable livelihood for the inflicted individuals.

- The complexity of the conflict and Sida’s current level of engagement calls for a high degree of focus in terms of (i) policy areas and (ii) cooperative partners. This recommendation will be valid even in the case of quite substantial increase in the support level. Existing partners within the international community and civil society seems like the natural entry point for focused support. Concrete suggestions on how to achieve a focused approach in relation to key conflict areas are outlined in section
• Sida may consider an intensified policy dialogue with existing partners to assure a satisfying level of coherence and sophistication in the problem analysis and approach.

• The conflict in Burundi has regional solutions why regional considerations and coordination are called for in relation to policy development and programme assessments.

• The approach to many conflict areas in Burundi is mapped out in the Arusha Agreement. In consideration of the controversial context in which the Agreement was reached, and the complexities of implementation, Sida should seek to strike a constructive balance between respect for the Agreement and Constitution, and need for pragmatism.

• Peace process dividends: The peace process could paradoxically generate widening frustration gaps. The peace process increases expectations and hopes. At the same time it takes a long time to reconstruct economic, political and social structures that are in shambles, even longer before an improvement from the prerequisites-conflict situation could be achieved. Withheld international support could in a delicate transition phase widen the frustration gap through increased frustration, and through not rewarding the political leadership trying to broker peace. In that way a too careful approach might risk de-legitimating both the peace process, and the donors.

This is an argument for the international community to give substantial support in the transition period, even if it is very difficult, and carries high transaction costs. The value added of a firm commitment to the peace process must be manifested in the everyday lives of Burundians. Without peace process dividends, the return to violence is eminent.

As we have argued throughout this report, the question is how to achieve this, with what means, which channels to use, where to enter and with what sequencing – with a minimum requirement not to cause any harm. The needs are enormous, the challenges gigantic, the complexity immense and the interplay of forces makes any prediction of likely future development uncertain. Nevertheless, it is our conclusion that the conflicts determine how, not how much, to work in the Burundi. That is to say that the conflicts call on specific strategic considerations on how to work in and on the conflicts. But the conflicts do not constitute insurmountable obstacles for engagements. Sida should thus support the peace process by not conditioning further engagement on a nation wide cease-fire.
4.2. Policy recommendations in relation to key conflict areas

The following section contains suggestions on what Sida can do in relation to the key conflict areas elaborated in the Scenario Analysis. The suggestions are informed by Sweden’s and Sida’s current and historical engagements, as well as ongoing initiatives by other donors. Furthermore, the suggestions are developed in light of the Cooperative Framework for Burundi outlined above as well as the recently undertaken Conflict Analysis of the Great Lakes Region, and relevant policy papers from Sida. The suggestions should be seen as an input to ongoing discussions within Sida and be exposed to the critical evaluation of in-house experts and partners in Burundi as well as in multilateral and civil society institutions.

The suggestions are process-oriented and relatively independent of whether the developments are in the direction of the Best or Worst case scenario above.

4.3. Direct violence alleviation

Sida has no direct role to play in the actual negotiations on a cease-fire agreement in Burundi which should be left to the Arusha process and engaged regional and national actors, in particular the Implementation Monitoring Committee consisting of 29 individuals, including representatives of the Arusha signatures, mandated to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.

However, Sida can work indirectly by:

1. Financial and political support for the negotiation process and different parties. Sida should restrict its support to financial support for existing mechanisms. Sida should not rule out a bilateral programme with the Burundi Government but no decisive recommendation can be made on this very politically sensitive and administratively complex issue. Sida should engage in more direct dialogue with other donors, in particular the IMF, who are currently working bilaterally with the government. Any bilateral support to the Government must be subjected to strict control mechanisms to ensure a reasonable level of good governance.

   It should be taken into consideration that decisive donor support to the government and the Arusha process can be a vital signal to hesitant rebel groups who still think that there is a wide spectrum of alternative venues.

2. Sida could try to evade the “cease-fire hang-ups” in the international donor community’s relation to Burundi. This has placed the relationship between the donors and partners in Burundi in an unfortunate moment 22 that undermines the legitimacy of the Arusha process: Donors await a cease-fire before it will engage fully. The transitional government, backed by,
among others, Nelson Mandela, argues that the donor support is vital for the achievement of a lasting peace.

Arguments for not waiting for a cease-fire are found in the history of the Burundi conflict. Burundi has for decades found itself simultaneously in a pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict situation. As has been argued above, this calls on the international community to have a high level of geographic and sector flexibility. Conditioning full engagement in Burundi on a cease-fire is likely to lead to disappointments as the odds for any cease-fire agreement to endure without violations are quite low.

The lack of donor dividends undermines the Arusha process in two ways: (i) It provides opponents of the Arusha process with the argument that, as not even the donor community is committed to the process, why should we invest in it? (ii) It increases the gap between expectations and realisation that fuels frustration and conflict. As Mandela put it at the Donor Conference on Burundi in Paris, Dec 2000: “It must be made possible for the people of Burundi to materially distinguish between the destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of peace”. The expectations that the donors would aid Burundians to realise this distinction is fading and being replaced by increasing frustration.

The current tension between donors and Burundi creates a premium for any donor who would step up and break the current deadlock. A firm commitment by any donor, followed up by immediate and serious action would most likely be met by sincere appreciation on behalf of the Transitional government. The premium could be exchanged for donor demands on structural reforms and conditions conducive to an effective donor partnership.

In this context it should be borne in mind that Sweden’s engagement in Burundi in 1994, when most donors cut down their programmes, provides a presidency of independence on behalf of Sweden’s approach to Burundi.

3. In contrast to Sweden’s relatively modest role in Burundi, Sweden is a large player in relation to Tanzania who in turn is heavily involved in the conflict. Sweden should use its role in Tanzania to encourage Tanzania to play a constructive role in the Burundi conflict. The most sensitive, but perhaps also most decisive issue is support from Tanzania to FDD. Many, well-positioned analysts claim that the direct violence in Burundi will only cease if this support is cut off. The nature of the Tanzanian connection, and in particular the role of the Tanzanian government, must of course be critically evaluated. However, the information on the link and the significance of this support is too persistent to be ignored.

Security sector reform
Sida has no direct role to play in the negotiations for a security sector reform.
Indirectly, Sida can support the negotiations by:

4. Pledging support to people retrenched from the security sector. In particular, Sida address the needs for cognitive reintegration and psychological rehabilitation. In addition, Sida’s support should include support to provide these people with the means to build a sustainable livelihood, as well as engage in the economic reconstruction of the country.

5. Support the modernisation of a reformed security sector by training programs in, for example human rights.

Reintegration of former combatants

6. Sida can work through existing initiatives and support the reintegration of former combatants though the Arusha framework and the National Fund for Sinistrés that is outlined in Protocol IV as well as the World Bank MDRP programme for the Great Lakes Region.

7. In particular, Sida can address the former combatants needs for cognitive reintegration and psychological rehabilitation in line with the general focus on this area suggested above.

4.4. Structural violence alleviation

Structural constraints incl. natural and economic resources

The structural constraints in Burundi calls for a comprehensive approach including reforms at local, national, and regional level. Burundi will also be sensitive to changes at the international level in terms of regulations of international markets for agricultural products.

Sida can offer:

8. Local level support to
   (i) Kick-start small scale subsistence framing (providing basic equipment and seed);
   (ii) support to income generating groups in civil society (perhaps with a focus on women);
   (iii) facilitate risk capital to local entrepreneurs.

9. National level
   (i) support to increase negotiation capacity in relation to the international community of donors;
   (ii) support existing UN and WB programmes for Macro Economic Reform;
(iii) support to institutions for demarcation and consolidation of private property rights;
(iv) capacity building in civil society to facilitate “voices of the poor” in structural reform programmes. Specific focus can be paid to women.

10. Regional level
(i) Strengthen Burundi’s capacity in the ongoing dialogue on Burundi’s application to EAC;
(ii) Strengthen Burundi’s capacity in the projects on water related projects within the framework of Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP).

Reintegration of refugees and IDPs
With between 600 000 and 800 000 refugees, Burundi is the largest net contributor to the refugee in the Great Lakes Region. Adding the magnitude of the reintegration problem is the 280 000 - 380 000 IDPs.

A programme successfully addressing the displacement of refugees and IDPs is a prerequisite for a positive development of the conflict. To achieve donor coordination and resource efficiency, Sida could focus on financial support to the World Bank framework for the Greater Great Lakes Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. In line with the above section Approaching a Cooperative Framework for Burundi, Sida could engage in dialogue with the Bank to integrate a component of cognitive reintegration into its programme.

4.5. Cognitive reintegration

Cognitive reintegration and national reconciliation
Sida can play an active and direct role in the process of national reconciliation. The Arusha Agreement Protocol IV, Chapter 2, can be used as a point of departure for this support. Likewise, Sida can draw on the recent Sida study “Reconciliation – Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation” by Karen Bronéus. Concrete actions that can be supported by Sida are:

11. Reconciliation dialogues between political and military elites from a wide range of camps. In relation to suggestions four and five above, Sida could work in cooperation with actors from other African regions victimised by ethnic conflict, for example South Africa. Among the actions that can be undertaken are field trips to South Africa to facilitate the exchange of experiences and ideas with peers.

12. Reconciliation dialogues with intelligental and academics. The aim would be to critically examine and validate current narrations of the conflict history in the country and region.
13. As a possible outcome of the academically-oriented reconciliation dialogues, Sida may assist in the development and distribution of history books and related educational material at all levels of education in Burundi. In this context it should be noted that Sweden has a long history of support for the educational sector in Burundi and it could be argued that this gives Sweden a comparative advantage in the educational sector. Among current support programmes in Burundi are UNICEF’s Basic Education for Peace that can perhaps be used as an entry point.

14. Sida could also promote cognitive reintegration and national reconciliation by further educating and training media in reporting that does not entrench ethnic violence and stigmatisation. This effort could have a direct regional outreach and enrol journalists from all countries in the region. A number of networks of media actors exist and could be used as entry points, including Press House in Bujumbura, Association Burundi de Journalist (ABJ), as well as the popular media actors such as Studio Ijambo.

**Cognitive reintegration and trauma counselling**

15. Sida may engage in support of trauma counselling of victims of conflict in Burundi and the region. Thousands of people live with war traumas and little attention is paid to this aspect of reintegration in current programmes. Among the most afflicted groups are women, children, demobilised soldiers, and child soldiers. This effort could be developed as a component to existing programmes, for example the UNDP umbrella programme for community development in Burundi. Competence for this component could be developed in relation to existing experiences from other regions, for example Southern Africa, and be extended to a regional programme for cognitive reintegration in the Great Lakes Region.

4.6. Support to democratic governance and rule of law

**Democratisation**

16. As has been argued above, the democratisation process in Burundi is in a dilemma where the Presidential elections, set out in the Arusha Agreement before November 2004, have the potential of delaying the long-term democratisation process. Sida can be part of the solution for this dilemma. What is needed is a clear signal from the international community that they comprehend the complexity of the democratisation process and that they will not condition disbursement with the November 2004 election if a broad agreement can be found between the Arusha signatories. Sida can use bilateral as well as multilateral channels to send this signal, as well as offer support for a dialogue on the long-term democratisation in Burundi.


**Ethnic tension**

The issue of ethnic tensions take centre stage in the engaged actors’ account of the conflict in Burundi. Ethnicity is also a dominating theme in both academic and policy-oriented texts on Burundi. Yet there is a surprisingly simplistic treatment of this concept in the donor community. Interview with donors in Burundi exposed highly simplified and stigmatising views on ethnicity. Donor engagement based on such understandings of ethnicity stands a high risk of perpetuating rather than helping to resolve ethnic tensions in Burundi. Not to address this issue would thus be attempting to work *around* the conflict.

17. Sida could engage in a dialogue with other donors on the issue of ethnicity in aid to Burundi and the Great Lakes Region.

In this context Sida may also find it appropriate to update its own understanding of the concept and its knowledge of Best Practices on how to approach and overcome ethnic differentiation. The rich international research and experience on the subject should be useful. What is more, the highly contrasting national policies in Rwanda and Burundi seems like ideal cases for a comparative study and policy dialogue which could inform Sida’s stand on ethnicity in Burundi and beyond.

**Legal system and Human Rights**

Burundi is in great need of capacity building within the judicial system and Sida can benefit from existing channels to extend its support. Among the things Sida could do are:

18. Support UNHCR in the programme of local Human Rights observers in Burundi (due to cutbacks, the number of observers have been cut back from twenty one to just three).

19. Support for education and training of lawyers at the Faculty of Law at the University. Today Burundi has around 60 lawyers, some with questionable education and training and far from free from rumours of corruption.

20. Support Government of Burundi to provide competitive salaries to existing staff, to stop the brain-drain to the private sector, and cut back corruption.

21. Support the return of legally trained diasporas.

22. Support for local level institutions who, within a state-sanctioned framework, can function as arbitrators. The Bashingantahe could be an entry point for this support. However, the capacity and quality of the Bashingantahe should not be taken at face value and educational and/or control mechanisms should accompany any support.

23. Support for civil society acting in the legal sector, i.e. Cadre de Consultation, an umbrella for NGOs engaged in human rights, whose current support from UNHCR is deemed insufficient.

END