



## 4 SYNERGIES

### BLOWING THE WINDS OF CHANGE

When we, a group of young Serbs – living both in Serbia and abroad, proud of both our Serbian origin and our European aspirations – set out to create the Institute 4S, our goal was clear and simple: we wanted change.

We wanted Serbia to move faster, work better and trust more – both

itself, its neighbours and the entire European family of nations.

We are not blind and we are not auctritches – we know that Serbia lacks much. But we also know Serbs can do much more and are worth more than some – still living in the 1990s black-and-white conflict mindset – would like to portray.

page 2



Belgrade: detail from the "The Victor" statue, overlooking New Belgrade



Brussels: EU quarters

# DISMEMBERING DEMOCRATIC SERBIA

THE PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE STATUS OF KOSOVO BY UN ENVOY MARTTI AHTISAARI SETS TWO DANGEROUS, HIDDEN TRAPS FOR DISMEMBERING SERBIA AND STANDS NO CHANCE IN BELGRADE, EVEN WITH A NEW PRO-EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT.

page 2

### MOSCOW'S KOSOVO TAKE (RUSSIA'S INTEREST)

The position of Russia, a UN Security Council and Contact Group member, has become of key importance for the solution on the future status of Kosovo. From the beginning of the negotiation process, Russia holds the position that the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the fulfillment of "standards" are the basis for the settlement. Moscow is in favor of a solution that takes into account the interests of both negotiating parties and argues that the Contact Group should play a role of a mediator assisting to strike the compromise by means of recommendations, but not to impose a decision on one of the parties.

page 3

### APHOCALYPSE NOW!

#### Serbian Satirical Aphorisms

Did you ever believe a Chinese fortune cookie?

Of course not. They are tasteless and their proverbial messages have been so much chewed upon that they've long lost any kind of truthful flavor.

CUT through time and space, here comes the new fast food prophecy – the Serbian satirical aphorism, postmodern style.

Just like a mix of cultures and torments has shaped the delicious, highly caloric Serbian cuisine, so have the political and social circumstances in post-WWII Yugoslavia patched up another kind of fulfilling intellectual aphrodisiac – the one-or-two-liner aphorism, the best embodiment of Serbia's trademark ironic morale.

page 7

### KOSOVO'S PANDORA BOX

*One of the most dangerous and unrealistic ideas circulating today in international politics consists of considering the Serbian province of Kosovo as a "unique" case.*



## Institute 4S

### Symbol of Serbian Synergy Scope

*Under such thinking, Kosovo's independence should be imposed on Serbia in breach of all international laws and regulations, but the solution would somehow not become an applicable precedent to any of the hundreds of other similar disputes and territorial claims worldwide. Those arguing why Kosovo's case should be "unique" suggest it should be so be-*

*cause: a) the province had a recent history of institutional discrimination and brutal crackdown against a separatist campaign, b) NATO bombed in 1999 and c) the UN has been administrating the province in the last seven years.*

*But is Kosovo really so unique?*

page 3

### EU'S ROLE IN THE KOSOVO COMPROMISE

Washington's push for some form of independence has been opposed by Moscow's threat to use a veto in the UN Security Council in order to prevent a one-sided solution, unacceptable to Serbia.

This leaves the European Union – with its four members in the Contact Group (France, Britain, Germany and Italy) and two in the UNSC – in the position to shift the balance either towards "more independence" or towards "more autonomy".

Although it is the member countries of the Contact Group and the UNSC which are leading the process, Brussels would be wrong to let the solution to the status cause a rift within the EU and let UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari propose a comprehensive plan without its full backing.

page 5

### THE STATUS OF KOSOVO AS SEEN FROM AN ENCLAVE

We are not hardliners, just normal people living under terrible conditions "only two hours of flight away from the European capitals", to quote a common phrase from the 1990s wars.

We are trying to integrate, but we don't want to cut links with Belgrade. We want to cohabitate with the majority Albanians, but not at the price of giving up our identity.

In case of independence, the result will be either a total boycott and isolation of Kosovo Serbs or a mass exodus. Kosovo will become either a grotesque apartheid or a monstrous monoethnic state in the heart of Europe, a true "precedent" in modern politics indeed.

page 4



## 4 SYNERGIES

After six months of existence, we distributed 4,000 copies of our cd-rom "Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise" to leaders, policymakers, diplomats, analysts and journalists on all six continents; we attracted dozens of thousands of visitors to the cd-rom's site [www.kosovocompromise.com](http://www.kosovocompromise.com), organized ten promotions in seven countries, got quoted in over 70 media items in 15 world languages.

Numbers are not everything. They can sometimes be symbolic, sometimes also part of a symbol. Like in our name – 4S – Symbol of Serbian Synergy Scope.

The term refers to a necessary synergy 1) between Serbian and European interests, 2) among Serbian people, 3) between the Serbs in Serbia and their diaspora, and 4) between the Serbs and other nations they live with.

When we, a group of young Serbs – living both in Serbia and abroad, proud of both our Serbian origin and our Euro-

pean aspirations – set out to create the Institute 4S, our goal was clear and simple: we wanted change.

We wanted Serbia to move faster, work better and trust more – both itself, its neighbours and the entire European family of nations.

We are not blind and we are not au-triches – we know that Serbia lacks much. But we also know Serbs can do much more and are worth more than some – still living in the 1990s black-and-white conflict mindset -- would like to portray.

We are deeply frustrated by the lack of progress in the understanding of Serbia and the Serbian nation as a whole. We are angry about double-standards – in particular in regard to Kosovo. We refuse to accept this as a fait-accompli.

That is why the Institute 4S was formed in Brussels. As a non-profit, non-governmental organization aimed at moni-

toring and analyzing European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes of Serbia and the Serbian people, as well as exchanging and proposing ideas, contacts and solutions to strengthen and speed up these processes.

We are not linked to any political party or state institution whatsoever and will remain so, but we are keen on Serbian interests: be it in regional reconciliation, in the struggle against the independence of Kosovo, in the pursuit of talks on Stabilization and Association with the EU, in the campaign for the integration into the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme, in the fight against any kind of extremism, prejudice and hypocritical abuses of the rule of law.

We believe that Serbs and their fellow Europeans can create synergies and focus better their intellectual and political resources on making the right moves.

This Institute will seek to provide tools and solutions for better cooperation and

understanding among Serbs, between Serbs and their regional partners as well as between Serbia and the EU.

With the cd-rom "Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise" we have achieved our aim: we have stirred and shaken the international debate on Kosovo. With the newsletter "In Press 4S", we want to continue on this path and introduce new ideas and new faces writing on Serbia, the Serbs, their regional role and their European integration in the political, security, economic and cultural field. Our upcoming projects, such as the analytical network "Future 4S", the Institute's web portal and the economic program will soon be underway. See you on the road from Belgrade to Brussels.

*Predrag Ćeranić is the Director and one of the founders of the Institute 4S.*

*Predrag Ćeranić*


## DISMEMBERING DEMOCRATIC SERBIA?

The proposal for the future status of Kosovo by UN Envoy Martti Ahtisaari sets two dangerous, hidden traps for dismembering Serbia and stands no chance in Belgrade, even with a new pro-European government.

Ahtisaari's first trap lies in the packaging of his proposal. Wrapped in the format of "limited sovereignty", the crux of Ahtisaari's proposal is expected to be a gradual, supervised form of independence, which in fact means that "Kosovo is not (yet) an independent state, but is (already) independent from Serbia". In practice, signing up such a proposal would amount to accepting "slightly-delayed" independence.

The second trap stems from the first one and relates to the implementation of the agreement. Only someone naïve, with a short memory and superficially informed about the Kosovo situation would forget the way the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 had been implemented. Ever since 1999, year after year, the international administration in Kosovo incrementally kept on building up the province's attributes of 'statehood' instead of imposing "substantial autonomy" measures, as requested by the world's top body. Instead of adequately implementing the resolution, which in none of its articles mentions independence, the UN Mission in Kosovo systematically breached it.

This situation set the bases for Ahtisaari's proposal of a "step-by-step independence", a new phase in the long-term "independent Kosovo" project. In that light, Ahtisaari's proposal is not about



the definitive status of Kosovo, but it is definitive in regards to its relationship to Serbia, because it represents the separation of the province from its motherland. To put it bluntly, it breaks up Serbia from its cultural and spiritual cradle and steals away 15 percent of its territory. No politician in Serbia, or anywhere else in the world, would accept that.

The concept of "gradual independence" represents, in addition, a true mockery out of 21st-century human rights.

This proposal suggests a trading of "human rights for status" and argues that the Kosovo Albanians should obtain an independent state if they finally start respecting the human rights of the Serbs which they have been violently breaching in the last seven years.

On the other side, there is no guarantee that the so-called Kosovo human rights "standards" will ever be achieved. After the strategy of "Standards Before Status", created in 2003, was abandoned due to a political decision to speed up the process of the status resolution, what are the guarantees that there will be no fur-

ther downplaying of the importance of achieving those basic standards? Would that strategy be then called: "Standards After Independence ... maybe"?

The proposal for a "supervised", "conditional" or "limited" independence of Kosovo changes de facto the character of the Kosovo "talks". It means that a compromise had been rejected and that one side got it all (with a short waiting period), while the other one lost everything (immediately). It means, also, that all this time the talks have not been about finding a sustainable, compromise solution, but instead about finding the "modalities to achieve the independence of Kosovo" and about the "status of the Kosovo Serbs in an independent Kosovo".

Serbia will again face strong Western pressure claiming that Belgrade cares only about its "nationalist past and territories", instead of its "European future and its people".

Ahtisaari will insist on the quality of his decentralization paper, while introducing through the backdoor gradual independence, the separation of Kosovo

from Serbia.

Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs will not accept this game.

While, a year ago, a wide media spin campaign kept suggesting that "Serbia should not even be asked, Russia could be bought, Western unity was a sealed deal, and a UN Security Council decision was perhaps not even needed" – today, things look differently.

An imposed solution in the UN Security Council is now unlikely due to Russia's opposition to any solution unacceptable to Belgrade. A solution without Serbia is seen as difficult to implement. A solution outside the UN Security Council is seen as undesired because of a legal limbo it might create in the international arena. Inside the EU, a growing number of countries – one Council of ministers after another -- reject independence as the unique option.

Instead of tearing up a country, creating new borders and further balkanizing the Balkans, Ahtisaari should try to patch up the previous mistakes of the UN mission in Kosovo and to bring back the negotiations on a fair track. For everybody's good, not only Belgrade's.

*Aleksandar Mitić is the Brussels correspondent of the Tanjug news agency and director of the Institute 4S project "Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise" ([www.kosovocompromise.com](http://www.kosovocompromise.com))*

*Aleksandar Mitić*



# KOSOVO'S PANDORA BOX

One of the most dangerous and unrealistic ideas circulating today in international politics consists of considering the Serbian province of Kosovo as a "unique" case. Under such thinking, Kosovo's independence should be imposed on Serbia in breach of all international laws and regulations, but the solution would somehow not become an applicable precedent to any of the hundreds of other similar disputes and territorial claims worldwide.

Those arguing why Kosovo's case should be "unique" suggest it should be so because

a) the province had a recent history of institutional discrimination and brutal crackdown against a separatist campaign, b) NATO bombed in 1999 and c) the UN has been administrating the province in the last seven years.

But is Kosovo really so unique?

So much blood has been shed, so many interventions have been led, so many international administrations and peacekeeping forces have ruled dozens of other regions around the world facing a similar perspective of separatism. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Palestine, Tamil Eelam, Northern Cyprus, the Basque Province, Chechnya, Northern Ireland, western Macedonia, Republika Srpska, Tibet, Taiwan, Kurdistan...

All of these areas, and many more, will be following the Kosovo talks very closely, especially given that most of them have suffered even more violent, hateful conflicts and have waited for the solution of their problem much longer than the province of Kosovo.

There are hundreds of ethnic groups in the world who feel "territorially" discriminated.

Are there any solid reasons that the case of Kosovo Albanians is superior to all the rest?

An Albanian state exists already just next door. Whereas most of the truly discriminated ethnic communities around the world dream of minimal autonomy, Kosovo Albanians want even more than full self-governance which Serbia is offering them: they want to create nothing less than a second Albanian state in the already fragile Western Balkans and thereby risk provoking other minorities to demand independence.

To those arguing that NATO's intervention in 1999 should be the basis for Kosovo's independence, one should remind the developments in Kosovo since then: the expulsion of more than 220,000 Serbs, the shameful enclaves and ghettos in which the remaining Serbs and other non-Albanians live still today, the destruction of 130 Orthodox churches, notorious organized crimes networks, blatant nationalist historical revisionism, some 60-70 percent unemployment in spite of uniquely large transfers of international funds into Kosovo. Since 1999, Kosovo's de facto existing military formations have participated in warfare in both southern Serbia and Macedonia.

Given the continuous pressure on the Kosovo Serbian community, it is easy to imagine that the independence of Kosovo would most certainly lead to a monoethnic Albanian Kosovo. Serbs who left will never come back.

As such, it would completely undermine the arguments of those who supported the NATO bombings in 1999 in the name of the "multiethnicity" of Kosovo. The bombing of 1999 would historically be seen as a campaign for the independence of Kosovo, which is light years

away from the proclaimed goals of the "humanitarian intervention".

This is a truly problematic perspective, especially since NATO's intervention was carried out by bypassing the UN Security Council.

With respect to law, Kosovo can become independent from Serbia only by voluntary negotiated agreement or by violating the 1945 UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final act, the 1991-92 Badinter Commission, the 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the 2006 Serbian constitution.

When Transnistria, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh voted last fall to reconfirm their earlier independence-minded paths, the international condemnations were outright.

When Russia says the solution for Kosovo should be equally applicable elsewhere – it is accused of plotting against its neighbours.

But, if Serbia's insistence on territorial integrity is "démodé" and Russia's insistence on universal standards "conspiratory", how does one explain the stances of a growing number of European Union member countries which are opposing Kosovo's independence and rejecting the idea of Kosovo's "uniqueness"?

At the last several meetings of the EU Council of ministers and heads of state, Spain, Cyprus and new EU member Romania were at the forefront of the EU bloc opposing Kosovo's secession.

Are these countries too falling to the "paranoid Serbo-Russian bloc" or are they plain and simply worried about the implications of Kosovo's illegal independence in the Basque country, Northern Cyprus or Transnistria?

It has been a public secret for a while now that some "goodwill advisors" had been suggesting to the team of UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari to find a "legal basis for the uniqueness of Kosovo in order to avoid setting a precedent".

But Ahtisaari should be cautious enough not to test this "one-time solution". Breaching international law might appease ethnic Albanian separatist aspirations in Kosovo, but it would certainly open a Pandora's box of separatist viruses worldwide.

*Jan Oberg is the Director of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (TFF) in Lund. Aleksandar Mitić is Chief Analyst at the Institute 4S in Brussels and TFF Balkans team leader.*

*Jan Oberg and Aleksandar Mitić*



Nikola Otas

## MOSCOW'S KOSOVO TAKE

The position of Russia, a UN Security Council and Contact Group member, has become of key importance for the solution on the future status of Kosovo.

From the beginning of the negotiation process, Russia holds the position that the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the fulfillment of "standards" are the basis for the settlement. Moscow is in favor of a solution that takes into account the interests of both negotiating parties and argues that the Contact Group should play a role of a mediator assisting to strike the compromise by means of recommendations, but not to impose a decision on one of the parties. It is possible that the Russian representative in the UNSC could exercise his right to a veto and would not allow an imposed solution on one of the parties.

### RUSSIA'S INTEREST

Russia is interested in the Kosovo case for several practical reasons, notwithstanding its traditional support for Orthodox and Slavic Serbia. First of all, the Russian Federation includes Chechnya, which had been fighting for 15 years to secede from the Federation. In the West, Chechnya is often called "the Russian Kosovo". After two military campaigns against the separatist movement in Chechnya during the 90s, the basic

resistance was broken by the Russian army, and the Chechen separatists have no leader to rally people and continue their fight. Instead, they rely only on scattered groups of rebels and organize frequent terrorist attacks all over Russia. Even if Kosovo achieves independence under a so-called "unique character", this precedent would be undesirable for the Russian government, given the possible impact on the other 20 republics of the Russian Federation.

Second, in the years 1992-1993, secessionist movements and bloody ethnic conflicts were followed by the formation of several republics in the territory of the former USSR. Now, unrecognized republics such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, as well as Transnistria in Moldova command support of Russia and its peace-making military presence. In the recent decade, the Russian Federation gave citizenship to people living in these republics, and now half of the residents are Russian citizens.

On September 17, 2006 there was a referendum in Transnistria and 97.2% of electorate said 'yes' to independence and joining the Russian Federation. The Transnistrian government asked Russia to recognize its independence, but Moscow as yet refused to. Concerning the secessionist Caucasian republics, the referendum in South Ossetia

on November 12, 2006 confirmed its independence drive.

It follows that if the independence of Kosovo is imposed on Belgrade or Kosovo exits from Serbia unilaterally -- which is possible according to the Kosovo Prime-minister Agim Ceku - Russia would likely recognize the independence of these three republics.

Thus, the settlement of the Kosovo status is a controversial matter for Russia: on one side, Chechnya threatens the integrity of the federation, on the other, an independent Kosovo could open the door to independence and international recognition for the secessionist pro-Russian republics now part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

### FIDELITY TO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES

The day before the January 31, 2006 Contact Group meeting in London, Russian president Vladimir Putin made recommendations on the Kosovo matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and clarified Moscow's official position. Putin said that the settlement should be prepared so that it could be used as a universal model for the solution of other similar problems around the world, especially in the territory of the former USSR. He mentioned Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, which would welcome Kosovo's indepen-

dence. If Kosovo gets independence without Belgrade's consent, but solely on support of some world powers, the secessionist republics would have the right to get advantage of such a precedent.

Fidelity to principle is clear: the result of the status should provide a lasting solution to this problem, and in the future, there should not be any claims and offences from any party that could lead to resumption of the conflict situation. Therefore, the final status must be supported by the UN and recognized by the world powers in particular. If Kosovo gets independence under such conditions, the other secessionist republics that are waiting for the precedent would have fewer chances to get independence and recognition. If Kosovo gets independence under other conditions -- such as imposition -- Russia may become the first state in the world to recognize those republics.

This argumentation suggests that the Russian government is confident about the solution to Chechen problem in its favor, does not fear the secessionist trends inside the federation and therefore can play "the Kosovo card" for achieving strategic diplomatic objectives.

*Maria Patrasco is a Moscow-based political analyst specializing in cross-cultural communications in ethnic conflicts in the Balkans.*

*Maria Patrasco*



# KOSOVSKA MITROVICA THE PARTS VS THE WHOLE

While it is true that the political situation in Kosovo is best reflected in the issue of Kosovska Mitrovica, one cannot agree with those saying that the future of Mitrovica will determine the future of Kosovo. The matter is rather the other way round.

For seven years now, Kosovska Mitrovica has been branded a "unique", "special" case. When one says Mitrovica, the first thought is of a 'divided city'. There are 220.000 Google entrances with only two keywords, 'Mitrovica problem'. It should not have been that way.

## THE LAST URBAN REFUGE

When the international troops entered Kosovo back in 1999, more than 800.000 Albanians got back to their homes in a short time. A surge of crimes then took place against the Serbian population. Kidnappings, rapes, murders, massive verbal and physical abuses and maltreatments, arsons and lootings terrified non-Albanians, which got expelled or fled. The international troops and administration blatantly failed to protect them.

While most Kosovo Serbs and Roma found refuge in central Serbia, many stopped in the northern part of the province, which has a Serbian majority, and gathered mainly in the northern part of the city of Kosovska Mitrovica, an area of only three square kilometers which makes up only one fifth of the 80,000+ city.

As all the other urban settlements in Kosovo were brutally emptied of non-Albanians, the Kosovo Serbs decided to put up a last stand at the Ibar river which divides the city of Mitrovica. They blocked the bridges and managed to prevent violent intrusions of Albanian extremists, despite many bloody incidents and terror attacks.

Seven years later, the lines in the stand-off remained unchanged. The southern part of the city is home to 70,000 Albanians and no Serbs, whereas the northern part is inhabited by 10,000 Serbs and c.2000 Albanians and Bosnians.

The international administration in Pristina and western capitals should have recognized this division as a natural, last-chance salvation for the dwindling Kosovo Serb community. Instead of praising Mitrovica North as the only remaining urban multiethnic area, they kept pointed a finger at Mitrovica, saying a division of the city in southern and northern parts was 'unacceptable'.

The Northern part of Mitrovica came under huge pressure. International politicians, pressured by the Albanian leaders, defined it as "the main problem in Kosovo", shifting the focus away from massive ethnic crimes committed in other cities such as Priština, Djakovica, Uroševac, Peć and Dečani, which were all cleansed of their entire non-Albanian population.

## IBAR FLOWS IN PEOPLE'S HEADS

Today, Kosovska Mitrovica is, before anything else, a policy-making problem: the bigger south wants to engulf the disobedient north.

In the city, people share real life problems. The destroyed infrastructure and great rate of unemployment have made many people coming out onto the streets and do small trading business. Illegally-installed kiosks and buildings, outdated and second-hand imported cars from abroad have ruined the original urban look of the city and caused traffic chaos. Adding to the problems of many years of lack of investment, the old neglected infrastructure, which could not support the postwar multiplication of the number of population, insufficient water and electricity supply, accommodation and occupied property, IDPs and poor, lack of youth programs and space, an increased crime rate and drug addicts -- it is evident that these are huge and realistic problems.

People struggle everyday with their problems but still manage to live next to each other. They are once getting used to the presence of the other community. Reconciliation should be a natural process instead of an imposed model. Perhaps, tomorrow, they will live one with each other. For now, the Ibar river flows in the heads of its residents as well.

## THE PARTS VS THE WHOLE

With the start of the negotiations, the international community has once again launched a strong political, diplomatic and security campaign aimed at Northern Kosovo, as if the question of how the North will respond to the proposed solution was more important than the status itself.

What the Serbian population wants is to have a separate Northern Kosovska Mitrovica municipality established de jure, instead of being engulfed in a single, southern-dominated organizational structure, as aggressively requested by ethnic Albanians. Local Serbs need to be encouraged and supported in those efforts. That is the only way to make them feel safe and secure, protected from the obvious administrative strangulation and majorisation from Pristina.

Ethnic Albanians should recognize this as an open card on the table. They need Serbs to preserve an image of a multi-ethnic society. Without "Northern Kosovska Mitrovica", chances for a future survival of the declining Serbian community, broken into a few enclaves in the southern and central part of Kosovo, including three pseudo-urban areas in the North, are almost impossible.

*Tatjana Lazarević is Coordinator of "Jelena Anžujška", a NGO based in northern Kosovska Mitrovica.*

# THE STATUS OF KOSOVO AS SEEN FROM AN ENCLAVE

The UN and NATO peacekeepers have failed in the last seven years to provide security and a normal life for non-Albanian communities. Despite international guarantees and security presence, over two thousand Kosovo Serbs have been killed or kidnapped and 150 000 have been expelled from their homes, forced to regroup into ethnically homogenous areas, ranging in size from one street block to a group of several villages and isolated from the ethnic Albanian majority for security purposes -- the so-called enclaves.

In this text, I will try to share with you what the status of Kosovo looks like these days from the perspective of a young man born in an urban area of the province and now living in one of the shameful ghettos.

The two main problems we are facing is a "security" threat and an "identity" threat.

The recent drop in ethnic attacks is only due to an unofficial 'ceasefire' during the status talks, because the Kosovo Albanian extremists know very well that further anti-Serb incidents would jeopardize their negotiation positions.

But as soon as the status question is opened, the attacks are likely to resume. If the Albanians are not satisfied, they will vent their anger at us, in a spontaneous or organized way, like in March 2004. If they are satisfied with the outcome, they will continue with their standard perfidious methods of pressure. Random shootings, bomb attacks, beatings, stonings, threats, intimidations, stealing of cattle or agricultural equipment, burning of hay, destruction of crops -- most of those incidents go unreported because they are difficult to prove, because the culprits are never found anyway and because the victims want to avoid dangerous publicity.

Albanian extremists are continuously using mafia-type methods to force even more Serbs to leave and sell valuable real-estate: they always target the most prominent community members first, forcing them to sell their property through repeated threats to family members, firing at windows, throwing grenades in the yard, etc. When the community leader breaks down, the rest of village follows quickly, selling their property at whatever price. The Serb majority becomes a minority, until only a few elderly people are left. All the signs of Serbian presence are destroyed, the cemetery is bulldozed, the name of the village is changed and the cadastre books disappear. On paper, Albanians can then boast even greater "demographic superiority", their main argument for independence.

As ever more Serbs are leaving Kosovo, very few are coming back. We feel very depressed by this negative trend. On this issue as well, there's great disproportion between what the Kosovo Albanian and UN authorities are saying and what they are doing. It seems that they are using up all their energy for mastering political newspeak, rather than showing real interest for improving the situation on the ground.

For example, the promise of rebuilding homes destroyed in recent waves of anti-Serb violence have amounted to patching up cheap houses just for the sake of photo opportunities. In reality, these "rebuilt" houses suffer from terrible construction work, bad floors, wrong electrical installations and no roof isolation, which makes them practically uninhabitable.

The local Albanian leaders are loudly inviting the expelled Serbs to return, but at the same time, extremists are sending threatening messages to the returnees. As a result, the homes stay empty, until

they are looted and stripped of everything that can be stripped -- from window frames to roof tiles and electrical plugs. On paper, the house has been rebuilt, but the Serbs didn't return "despite calls from the local Albanian leaders".

Other "friendly gestures" towards the Serb community are equally opportunistic, or even worse, they are openly conditioned by the status issue. The largest Serbian enclave in central Kosovo, a ring of villages around the XIVc monastery of Gračanica, is thus promised to be granted a status of municipality, as requested by the local Serbs, but "only if Kosovo becomes independent".

Such reasoning is not only cynical, it also refracts the second main problem the Kosovo Serbs are facing today: the issue of identity.

Kosovo has been a cultural and spiritual of cradle for all Serbs, and that is not an empty phrase. Throughout the centuries, the Serbian nation has made great sacrifices in order to preserve its identity. But in UN-run Kosovo, our rights to a cultural identity have been drastically limited. In a matter of months, over 150 churches and other heritage monuments have been destroyed, many of them jewels of medieval architecture and UNESCO heritage sites. Almost all signs of Serbian presence have been removed, dozens of graveyards have been desecrated, hundreds of street names and toponyms have been changed, all urban areas became cleansed of Serbs and using Serbian language became a matter of high risk outside of the enclaves.

On top of that, we are suddenly being called "Kosovars", a completely invented term and concept, which fits very well the total historical revisionism practiced by the Albanian authorities. Centuries of Serbian heritage have thus liter-

ally disappeared, never even mentioned in either school books, tourist guides or official Kosovo documents! 500 years of great political and cultural achievement, erased with one mouse-click! Such shocking distortions make us rightfully scared for our future in Kosovo.

Seceding Kosovo from Serbia means cutting Kosovo Serbs away from their motherland and forcing them to accept a perverted identity as « Kosovars ». We will not accept that, whatever the benefits Mr. Ahtisaari plans to offer us. Not only are you taking away from us the only thing that we got left, but you are also trying to convince us that our basic right to live is actually a privilege provided by the good will of the international community. No thanks.

We are not hardliners, just normal people living under terrible conditions "only two hours of flight away from the European capitals", to quote a common phrase from the 1990s wars. We are trying to integrate, but we don't want to cut links with Belgrade. We want to cohabitate with the majority Albanians, but not at the price of giving up our identity.

In case of independence, the result will be either a total boycott and isolation of Kosovo Serbs or a mass exodus. Kosovo will become either a grotesque apartheid or a monstrous monoethnic state in the heart of Europe, a true « precedent » in modern politics indeed.

But I wouldn't be living here if I didn't believe that a viable, compromise solution were still possible. I am just afraid that if the current opportunity is wasted, it will take generations of turmoil until a new one appears.

*Nenad Rikalo is Director of the NGO "Future" in Gračanica*



# EU'S ROLE IN THE KOSOVO COMPROMISE

Washington's push for some form of independence has been opposed by Moscow's threat to use a veto in the UN Security Council in order to prevent a one-sided solution, unacceptable to Serbia.

This leaves the European Union – with its four members in the Contact Group (France, Britain, Germany and Italy) and two in the UNSC – in the position to shift the balance either towards “more independence” or towards “more autonomy”.


Although it is the member countries of the Contact Group and the UNSC which are leading the process, Brussels would be wrong to let the solution to the status cause a rift within the EU and let UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari propose a comprehensive plan without its full backing.

While London is closer to Washington's stance, Madrid, Bratislava, Athens, Nicosia and Bucharest have either serious doubts or have straightforwardly opposed Kosovo's secession from Serbia.

The position of the EU – and its member countries -- should thus be the fruit of a compromise among member states, balanced and seeking to be acceptable in both Belgrade and Pristina.

Furthermore, it is not only a few members but the EU as a whole which will play a key role in Kosovo following a solution on the status and the departure of the United Nations. Brussels will also be the key guide towards the European perspective of Pristina, as well as of Belgrade, and will have a decisive influence on both sides.

As the process enters into full gear, the lenses through which the Kosovo status



prospects are seen today have changed and have opened a larger scope of the problem.

Those who have “seen independence through a crystal ball” a long time ago now have to realize that the solution will have to be a compromise, a win-win situation, and not a biased, black-and-white victory of one side over another.

In fact, for the first time in the last 15 years, Serbia is presenting strong legal and political, pro-European and pro-integration arguments. It has shown remarkable political unity in finding a common position on Kosovo and engraving it into the new post-Milosevic constitution.

Unfortunately, the Kosovo Albanian leaders have so far failed to start preparing their public opinion for the possible outcomes, and the gap between “huge expectations” and a “compromise” might

be hard to swallow for the Pristina hardliners, always ready to threaten with violence in case their maximalist goals are not fulfilled.

Yet, the alternatives to a true compromise are very grim: a deeply-frustrated Serbia, a secessionist domino effect in the region, in the Caucasus and the rest of the world, an unviable solution which would prevent effective cooperation in the region and turn off the lights of the European perspective of the Western Balkans.

One-sided solution or compromise – the EU will pay the price both ways, but it has the right to choose and it should choose smartly.

In the interest of the stability of the region, of the European perspective of Southeastern Europe, but also the security of the wider European region, the EU should stick to the following principles:

1) Give up the “laissez-faire” policy and maximum tolerance towards the Albanian side and the policy of permanent pressures and conditions against the Serbian side;

2) Respect internationally recognized borders, the Helsinki Final Act, the UN Charter and the results of the Badinter Commission which do not allow provinces of the former Yugoslavia (like Kosovo) to secede;

3) Avoid the policy of double standards;

4) Do all it can to find a solution which will give Kosovo the possibility to use all the instruments from the Stabilization and Association Process and allow its road towards the EU without giving it statehood status;

5) Work on strengthening the integration links between Pristina and Belgrade through the Kosovo Serbs as a bridge for this integration. Kosovo Serbs should become a bridge of cooperation and integration instead of a product of a trade-off “standards for status”.

Long-term principles or shortsighted one-sidedness? International law or double standards? A decisive European “no” to violence or a victory of Kosovo's “scarecrows”? A European perspective of the entire region or the pursuit of the “punishment” of Serbia? The balance of the Balkans is being weighted on Schuman square.

*Aleksandar Mitić is the Brussels correspondent of the Tanjug news agency. He directed the cd-rom project “Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise” ([www.kosovocompromise.com](http://www.kosovocompromise.com)).*

## BOOK REVIEWS

**“Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia” (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2006, 471 pages)**

The history and present day of Kosovo and Metohia are examined in this collection of articles and presentations from the conference organized in Kosovska Mitrovica by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The articles are divided in several chapters, titled: Identity, History, Law and (Geo)Politics, Economy and Population. From the understanding of the Kosovo myth, through the explanation of Kosovo's medieval art, to today's “False dilemma: Kosovo or Europe?”, the authors provide some well-known facts, but also offer some thought-provoking ideas, in particular in relation to the future status of the province. The added-value is the presence of authors of a younger generation, such as Nenad Ilić or Nenad Vasić. Although it might appear at first sight as a pot-pourri of various analyses, the volume compiled by professor Časlav Očić sheds a broad light on why Kosovo was, is and will be a “disputed land”. Institute 4S analyst Aleksandar Mitić contributed to the volume through the analysis “Serbia's Kosovo Media Agenda” in which he argued that a lack of Serbian media lobbying campaign was one of the main dangers facing the attempt to prevent the independence of Kosovo and called for an effective proactive communications campaign in order to give proper accent to Serbia's arguments.

**“Analyses: Kosovo special” (New Serbian Political Thought, 2006, 104 pages)**

This special volume by the Serbian analytical centre “New Serbian Political Thought” carries


analyses and speeches by President Boris Tadić, Prime minister Vojislav Koštunica, member of the Serbian negotiations team Dušan Bataković and several other prominent authors on the Kosovo issue. Mario Brudar argues that a compromise might be found in an independent, but cantonized Kosovo, while Zoran Stokić argues that a firm partnership between Serbia and the

United States in finding actual compromise solutions for Kosovo may be decisive for peace in the region. In the text “Pressure Against Compromise”, Institute 4S analyst argues that “in an open and argumented debate, the Serbian plan for a maximum autonomy of Kosovo would largely overshadow the Kosovo Albanian demand for a maximalist, one-sided and illegal solution – the

independence of Kosovo”. Nevertheless, he says that “at the outset of the talks, bias, double-standards and international pressure are being mostly applied against Belgrade”.

**“National and Inter-Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in the Western Balkans” (European Center for Peace and Development, 2006, 218 pages)**

The ECPD of the UN University of Peace, based in Belgrade, has set out to organize yearly conferences on tolerance in the Balkans, under an educational programme titled “The Balkans in the 21st Century – Finding the Ways Leading to Peace and Stability in the Balkans”. In this first volume, from the 2005 symposium, it offers 22 contributions from renowned world authors and experts. Chaired by ECPD president Takehiro Togo and executive director Negoslav Ostojić, the conference included a guest participation of Serbian President Boris Tadić. The authors offer solutions to ethnic and religious reconciliation from perspectives ranging from media to health development. Institute 4S analyst Aleksandar Mitić contributed with the article “The Role of the Media in Promoting Ethnic and Religious Reconciliation: Lessons, Warnings and Tips from the Journalist Perspective”. The 2006 symposium, devoted to “Human Security and Reconciliation” included participants such as former UN special envoy to the Former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi, the first president of the Republic of Seychelles Sir James Mancham, and various experts from a dozen universities and institutions. The Institute 4S contributed to the conference through its three introductory texts from the cd-rom “Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise”.





# WHAT SERBIA'S PfP CAN OFFER TO NATO?

THE SERBIAN MILITARY IS IN THE PROCESS OF INTENSIVE RE-STRUCTURING, MODERNIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION. THE AIM OF THESE PROCESSES IS TO CREATE A MILITARY WHICH WOULD COMPLY WITH NATO STANDARDS, STARTING FROM THE CIVILIAN CONTROL OF MILITARY AND GRADUALLY MOVING UPWARD TO INCLUDE WEAPONS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION. ONE OF THE MAJOR GOALS IS TO ESTABLISH HIGH LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY WITH NATO.

## TREMENDOUS IMPROVEMENT

One could analyze the NATO – Serbia relationship from different angles, but in general, after the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, there has been a tremendous improvement and significant efforts to establish closer cooperation and partnership. A pragmatic and partner-oriented relationship between the two sides was established in the aftermath of the 1999 conflict. Today, it continues to develop and evolve. One of the examples is the collaboration between the Serbian Army (formerly, the Yugoslav Army) and KFOR (NATO-led forces) in the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) on the administrative border of Kosovo. Serbia signed an agreement giving the right to NATO troops to pass through Serbia and Montenegro (2005), as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the U.S. Military. Serbia was admitted into the Partnership for Peace Program following a decision the NATO summit in Riga on 29 November 2006, and an official signing ceremony attended by president Boris Tadić on 14 December. A few days later, the NATO Military Liaison Office opened in Belgrade. All these important steps have considerably strengthened Serbia's relationship with NATO.

Looking back over the past few years, one could recognize the beginnings of a positive and productive relationship, which includes today a range from institutional cooperation at the military and diplomatic level to academic exchanges between NATO and Serbia. Given the current trend, there is optimism that in the near-term, the future looks promising for both sides as the relationship intensifies. That would include programs which open possibilities for Serbian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials to participate in NATO exchange



programs. Such a cooperation would not only bring a new kind of strategic thinking to the forefront of Serbian institutions, but would also help in the process of generating a new Serbian vision in which Serbia will have its role in supporting NATO's global mission. Today, NATO is playing an active role in providing support to the Serbian MoD. This is best exemplified in the overall military reform process, especially the areas dealing with civilian control of military and the adoption of NATO standards. One of the main vehicles for change is the Defense Reform Group, which was created in cooperation with experts from Norway. This is one of the most successful programs developed to-date in which various groups are working to facilitate cooperation with NATO by adopting all the necessary criteria.

## CLEAR DIRECTION

It is safe to say that Serbia's future is no longer dominated by great security uncertainties. From a strategic, military and political point of view, Serbian leadership has clearly expressed its desire to see the nation as an integral part of the European Union and as a candidate country for NATO membership. According to the adopted military doctrine, NATO integration is one of the primary future responsibilities for

the Serbian armed forces. However, any further progress is conditional on full cooperation with the ICTY, which includes all efforts to arrest and transfer former Bosnian Serb war commander General Ratko Mladić. The situation for Serbia joining NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) is an important symbolic and meaningful display of Alliance's good will, which supports Serbia's democratic processes. It is vital for the Serbian administration to fully cooperate—and to derive institutional benefit from the experience of NATO's Membership Action Plan (or MAPP)—so that the goal of eventual full membership is realized. This is the path of certainty that Serbia needs to travel in order to secure its place within the Euro-Atlantic Community of nations.

## CONTRIBUTION TO PFp

There is no doubt that Serbia is an important country and regional partner in Southeast Europe. Democratic leadership and a reformed security sector, which is under civilian control, are not only key components for secure country, but also a precondition for stability of the whole region. Serbia is prepared to give its contribution to U.N. and NATO peacekeeping missions, which would possibly include providing highly-skilled Special Forces, medical

units, technical detachments and police officers for CIVPOL missions. It is likely that in the near future Serbia will provide a medical unit for the NATO peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan (ISAF). Serbia could also offer partnership to NATO in many other areas related to higher-level education, research and development as well as highly-specialized training programs, including possible joint military operations and field exercises. Many NATO officials and experts who frequently visit Serbia claim that in the area of technical-military cooperation, Serbia is performing on a higher level compared with other PfP countries. The accession of Serbia to PfP has opened the door for shared knowledge and experience.

A new and democratic Serbia is ready and willing to discuss and coordinate its national defense and security policies on ongoing basis with NATO and its partners. Therefore, one could say with confidence that Serbia, as a new PfP member, will act as a loyal partner and nation which will work cooperatively to provide security to the region and the world. It is safe to say that Serbia will steadfastly move along the Euro-Atlantic road of integration.

Serbia should build its road towards NATO based on the positive experience of the Adriatic Charter countries, in order to show its full potential in the region. In this sense, Serbia can be a provider of security rather than its consumer.

*Marko Kovačević is Executive Director of The Atlantic Council of Serbia*

# THUMBS UP FOR SERBIA'S ECONOMY

"THE STRONGEST GROWTH IN 2006 WAS SEEN IN SERBIA, AT 6.3 PER CENT, WHILE SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES GREW AT 5 PER CENT OR MORE." (EBRD, 2006).

"IN THE LAST SIX YEARS, PRODUCTION GROWTH RATE IN SERBIA WAS INCREASED BY 40 PER CENT AND IN PARALLEL, WE HAVE A GDP GROWTH RATE AT 6.8 PER CENT" (IMF, 2006).

Observations of the international financial institutions on the Serbian economy have been very positive at the end of 2006. They are encouraging for Serbia's further economic development as they provide motivation and positive messages to foreign investors. In 2006, the Serbian state budget received some 1.6 billion euros through privatization, in addition to 2 billion euros from foreign direct investments.

Macroeconomic policy moved toward targeted inflation, which did not gather speed thanks to administrative price controls as well as a combination of circumspect fiscal and monetary policy measures. It is now expected from the new Serbian government to tighten fiscal policy, and the economy to grow at a slower pace.

One of the most attractive investment markets in Serbia – real estate – is still pretty much an



unknown, despite efforts by distinguished economists to shed some light on the issue. The real estate market in Serbia is still underdeveloped, and the post-electoral period will provide for further liberalization of the market.

In the next years, the employment rate is not expected to increase up to a satisfactory level (current unemployment rate is 24-27 percent), and the new government will strongly focus

on policies and measures aimed at stimulating new job openings (for example, a good model can be found in the National Investment Plan – state non-returnable grants to domestic and to foreign investors for every new created job post in sectors of production, R&D, IT, innovative services, etc.)

Moreover, taking further steps in the regulatory field, building institutions and pro-active cooperation with all relevant key players in

the international scene will enhance further positive trends and the investments share in the GDP. The rate should reach 30 per cent in the next two years (it is 20 per cent at present).

At the same time, public expenditure will progressively decrease in relative terms. It will also be necessary to decrease the tendency of private expenditure expansion. This should be taken into account in the upcoming years given that economic growth cannot guarantee debt consolidation and total servicing, even with a higher intensification of real incomes.

Finally, the new CEFTA horizon in 2007 is expected to have a beneficial contribution for Serbia.

*Vladimir Božić is economic analyst at the Institute 4S*



# APHOCALYPSE NOW!

## SERBIAN SATIRICAL APHORISMS

Did you ever believe a Chinese fortune cookie?

Of course not. They are tasteless and their proverbial messages have been so much chewed upon that they've long lost any kind of truthful flavor.

CUT through time and space, here comes the new fast food prophecy – the Serbian satirical aphorism, postmodern style.

Just like a mix of cultures and torrents has shaped the delicious, highly caloric Serbian cuisine, so have the political and social circumstances in post-WWII Yugoslavia patched up another kind of fulfilling intellectual aphrodisiac – the one-or-two-liner aphorism, the best embodiment of Serbia's trademark ironic morale.

But first of all, a disclaimer. Most Westerners make the simplifying mistake of calling any proverb or famous literary quote – an aphorism. There are many web pages and anthologies of such 'false' aphorisms quoting what Plato and Tcheckhov said about their caves or theirs guns, or paraphrasing Murphy's laws and Chinese fortune-cookie sayings.

An aphorism, as defined and practiced in Serbia, is a short, sharp, linguistically effective sentence or two, which imperatively contains an unexpected twist and which describes in a most striking, clairvoyant way the hidden truth of some common social matters or states of mind.

What makes Serbian aphorisms different from classic proverbs is their multilayered, open-ended nature, their surprisingly creative wordplays, their unpretentious individualism and their killer dose of black humor, satire and merciless sarcasm that still conveys a strong humanistic message.

Such satirical aphorisms appeared after WW2 in totalitarian countries of Eastern Europe where oppression was looser than elsewhere, namely in Poland and in the former Yugoslavia.

What started as an exercise de style of a few courageous writers quickly became picked up by ordinary people, and by the 1960s hundreds of amateur aphorists joined the movement, known in Serbia as the Belgrade Aphoristic Circle.

The main theme back then was an ironic criticism of the so-called "better life", a leitmotiv of communist demagoguery, which had to be done in a stylishly veiled, indirect way so as to avoid censorship. The main goal was to restore a sense of individuality, dignity and psychological integrity of a confused and misled population.

After the 1980s, the situation in Poland calmed down, but the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia provided Serbian aphorists with a variety of inspiring new topics: civil wars & civic rights, hyperinflation & hypermarkets, UN sanctions & peacekeeping missions, untouchable mafias & great dictators, endless transitions & democratic limitations...

In general, the more difficult and hopeless the times in which we live are,

the more repression, stupidity and lie there is -- the more fertile and intense the spiritual resistance of the aphorists will be.

This connection is strongly expressed by Aleksandar Baljak, Serbia's most prominent aphorist, when he 'optimistically' predicts: Our best aphorisms were created in difficult times, but for our modern satire – better days lie ahead.

A synthesis of literary art and colloquial philosophy, an aphorism reveals the depths of reality and discloses its true, ugly face. It has a demystifying, sobering role, but it also contains a concealed love and understanding for human misconceptions.

It is not a cheap thrill for the idle like a joke or a stand-up comedy one-liner, but a brave ethical act aimed at destroying everything that is unworthy, bad and fake in a society, but also inside ourselves.

This is why aphorisms can be a great way for empowering the individual; for asking or answering controversial questions; for accusing without moralizing; for apologizing without humiliating; for awareness raising; for self-criticism; for social introspection...

Aphorisms are inspiring both for those who make them and for those who read them. When you invent or hear such a fantastic diagnosis of a situation, you almost don't care what happens next, because you are already sure that you have understood it all, and that's what we're all here about.

In a time when the human rights industry has become not more than a big fundraising competition which benefits only the most shameless hustlers and whiners, our frail civilization deserves to have empowering tools that are freely available to all.

People in Serbia read affordable aphorism booklets in buses and waiting rooms, during lunch breaks or literary evenings, laughing on their own like happy lunatics. Aphorisms also appear in newspapers, and the best ones get picked up in slang, graffiti, street pro-

tests or screenplay lines.

I myself have systematically collected aphorisms for the last ten years. Whenever I wonder why I am still living in this crazy country after years of civil wars, domestic repression and international satanization, I turn to my collection of aphorisms for reassuring consolation and a 100%-proof optimism fix.

Understanding the world around you, fighting back at the Gods with pen and paper, turning satire into a state of mind – it really means transcending it all. All of a sudden, a wasted childhood becomes an asset; terminal living in Serbia – a privilege.

From this perspective, Serbia stops being a traumatized, post-war country lost in transition, and turns into a stylish crossroads full of off-beat characters trying to contribute to a better understanding of this world by making up great lines.

These authors – vagabonds, politicians, psychiatrists, dentists, postmen, winemakers... – have no illusions that they can change anything, but they also can't bear to stay idle, so they do a brilliant service to humanity – they make their ingenious comments public. If they can't change the world around us, at least they can change our perception of this world. More than often, this is more than enough.


From now on, this newsletter will feature a section on Serbian satirical aphorisms.

It will probably be the part that you read first and that you remember the most.

Occasionally, however, please remind yourselves where all this small wisdom originated from.

Boris Mitić is a Belgrade-based filmmaker, author of the award-winning documentaries "Pretty Dyana" and "Unmik Titanik". He is currently shooting his third documentary film "Aphocalypse Now!", on the phenomenon of Serbian satirical aphorisms.

[www.dribblingpictures.com]



Jugoslav Vlahović

\*  
*I have a choice:  
I will either be a marionette  
or my life will hang by a thread.*

Rade Jovanović  
pensioner

\*  
*Why shouldn't we be proud of our past  
when each new day is worse than the previous one?*

Aleksandar Čotrić  
deputy minister

\*  
*Only those who believed the rumors that there  
was not enough food died of hunger.*

Raša Papeš  
child dentist

\*  
*After the seventh glass, I drank the sixth one.  
After the sixth, I drank the fifth one.  
And so on, until I sobered up.*

Milan Beštić  
sales consultant

\*  
*Protesters were brutally attacking, with their  
backs, the sticks of surprised policemen.*

Aleksandar Baljak  
aphorist

\*  
*When I returned from the interrogation, my  
mother recognized me right away.  
Her heart was telling her that was me.*

Milan Todorov  
winemaker

\*  
*Democracy is when you can say  
what don't even dare to think about.*

Dragan Rajičić  
gas-station worker

\*  
*The Minister was astonished when he found  
out that he was receiving a triple salary.  
He immediately drew up a budget to start an  
investigation.*

Momčilo Mihajlović  
copyshop clerk

\*  
*When I see a destroyed mosque,  
I am ashamed to be a Serb.  
When, a bit further, I see a destroyed church,  
I am proud to be a Serb.*

Iva Mažuranić  
barfly journalist

\*  
*Shakespeare never said:  
"Something is rotten in the state of England".*

Vladimir Jovičević Jov  
international chess master

\*  
*War criminals were giving autographs.  
That's how the peace deal was signed.*

Slobodan Simić  
psychiatrist

\*  
*The worst has not passed.  
The best is yet to come.*

Ilija Marković  
economist

\*  
*Finally, there was light at the end of the tunnel.  
Not one, but two!*

Božo Marić  
history professor

# 5,000 HOPES FOR A COMPROMISE

From Gračanica to Chicago, the worldwide promotion of the Institute 4S analytical cd-rom "Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise" has reached nine towns and cities, with the participation of up to 1,000 officials, diplomats, politicians, experts and journalists, and the distribution of more than 1,500 copies of the product.

In clear and concise multimedia format, this disc presents crucial background to the Kosovo conflict and provides for the first time a wide-scale, in-depth analysis of the possible outcomes of the status talks, with real pro and cons, causes and consequences, bluffs and arguments, winners and losers.

The first, so-called "European" leg of the tour, went from Rome, through Paris, to Paris and Vienna. Members of the Serbian negotiations team on Kosovo (Slobodan Samardžić, Sanda Rašković-Ivić, Dušan Bataković and Aleksandar Simić) participated at the promotions, giving an insight on the Serbian negotiations platform on Kosovo.

The second, "Serbian" leg

of the tour, had stops in Belgrade, Kosovska Mitrovica, Gračanica, Banjaluka as well as in Chicago, at the annual conference of the Serbian Unity Congress.

Participants at the promotions included EU and NATO officials, diplomats from member countries, parliamentarians, experts from renowned NGO's and think-tanks. The director of the project Aleksandar Mitić, research coordinator Boris Mitić and production manager Predrag Čeranić presented the project and outlined its purpose and argumentation.

The distribution of the cd-rom was furthermore carried by all main Serbian state and non-state institutions: from the Serbian negotiations team, the Serbian government, the Presidency, the Assembly, the Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija, the Foreign Ministry, to the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Thanks to this synergy, almost 5,000 copies have been distributed to date – including to some of the world's top officials, negotiators, mem-



bers of the UNOSK team and of the Contact Group countries, parliamentarians of the US Congress, Russian Duma and European Parliament.

In addition, up to 100 media items have been written about the cd-rom and its contents in 15 languages – from German through Romanian to Catalan.

Finally, the web site of the cd-rom was visited by dozens of thousands of people from around the world. This has led to feedback from "priests in Philadelphia to analysts in the Philippines" and copy requests from some of the leading US and UK universities.

[www.kosovocompromise.com](http://www.kosovocompromise.com)



**Institute 4S**  
Symbol of Serbian Synergy Scope

**Institute 4S, Brussels**  
**Symbol of Serbian Synergy Scope**  
**Boulevard Louis Schmidt 103, 1040 Brussels**  
**Trg Nikole Pašića 5a, 11000 Belgrade**  
**office@institute4s.com**  
**www.institute4s.com**

This newspaper is edited in Brussels.  
Editor-in-chief: Aleksandar Mitić (aleksandar.mitic@institute4s.com)

Institute 4S, Boulevard Louis Schmidt 103, 1040 Brussels  
[www.institute4s.com](http://www.institute4s.com)

Design & paging: Vojnović Art Factory, Belgrade  
[www.vaf.co.yu](http://www.vaf.co.yu)

Production & marketing: Apostrophe, Belgrade  
[www.apostrophecom.com](http://www.apostrophecom.com)

©, ® Insitute 4S, Brussels. For the publisher: Aleksandra Milanović (aleksandra.milanovic@institute4s.com) All rights reserved.